# SOUND POLITICKS

# letter from the editors

The works that you will find within these pages are important contributions to the dynamic system of civil discourse upon which this country was built.

In this issue, student authors lend their voices to the American political debate. You will read as one author examines social identity in American political culture, as another studies the future of primary reform, as the third discusses the impact of female leadership on social movement membership participation and as the fourth develops a nuanced reading of a small Georgian congressional district.

Our featured article, "Privilege and Prejudice: Partisan Realignment in the 1960s" by Aaron Ross, provides instructive insight into a particularly turbulent era in American politics. It is a piece that reminds us of the inherently dynamic nature of our political system – from the earliest days of its founding, through the 1960s, and up to the 24-hour news cycle that dominates American political life today.

Politics – we must remember – is most safe, sound, and informative when informed by a multitude of voices. We present just a few of those voices here for your enjoyment.

Best wishes,

*Raquel & Sonya*

Raquel Finkelstein and Sonya Sackner-Bernstein
Editors-in-Chief

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“May the first principles
of Sound Politicks be fix'd
in the minds of youth.

# Privilege and Prejudice

## Partisan Realignment in the 1960s

BY AARON ROSS

Few political prognostications have proven as accurate as Lyndon Johnson's aside after signing the Civil Rights Act of 1964. "I think we've just delivered the South to the Republican Party for a long time to come,"[1] he told aide Bill Moyers. Indeed, the Democratic Party's embrace of civil rights in the early to mid-1960s corresponded closely with a resurgence of Republicanism in the region. A Democratic bastion since the end of Reconstruction, the South shifted political allegiances in a dramatic way. In the ten presidential elections preceding passage of the Civil Rights Act and Voting Rights Act of 1965 Democratic candidates won a combined 76 former Confederate states and only twenty in the ten years that followed. While Congressional partisan realignment was more gradual, change began quickly. South Carolina Senator Strom Thurmond bolted to the Republican Party just months after the signing of Civil Rights Act, accusing Democrats of being "engaged in an-other Reconstruction."[2]

Many Southern Democrats, few of whom had voted for the Civil Rights Act, refused to campaign with President Lyndon B. Johnson in 1964. One Georgia congressman went so far to note: "It would be poison now to say you'd even heard of Lyndon Johnson in Georgia."[3] Meanwhile, Alabama Governor George Wallace stirred white resentment during his campaign for the Democratic presidential nomination, using racial code words like "states' rights" and "law and order." Republican presidential candidate Senator Goldwater, a vigorous opponent of the Civil Rights Act—although not personally racist—followed Wallace's lead. He denounced the bill on the Senate floor as "the hallmark of the police state and a landmark in the destruction of a free society," later turning to more explicitly racist rhet-

1 Gary Donaldson, Liberalism's Last Hurrah: The Presidential Campaign of 1964 (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2003), 124.

2 Taylor Branch, Pillar of Fire: America in the King Year, 1963-65 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1998), 493.

3 Robert David Johnson, All the Way with LBJ: The 1964 Presidential Election (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 167.

oric in his allegations that "minority groups run this country." Though Johnson cruised to victory, Goldwater won the five Deep South states—the first time Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, and South Carolina had voted Republican since Reconstruction.

Nonetheless, some indicators cast doubt upon Johnson's ominous forecast. As Jason Sokol demonstrates, the southern response to the law proved much better than expected. As of January 1965, it was estimated that 75 percent of the Americans affected by Title II of the act, which prohibited discrimination in places of public accommodation, were abiding by it.[4] Mayor Allen Thompson of Jackson, Mississippi conceded that the new law repulsed him but considered it his obligation to comply: "It's the law and it must be obeyed until it is struck down."[5] Southern blacks were surprised by whites' quiet acceptance.[6]

From a political standpoint, the anticipated white backlash against the Democratic Party seemed to have been averted as well. Despite having lost the five Deep South states, President Johnson held on to the remaining six former Confederate states. High-profile brutality against civil rights activists in 1964 and 1965 bolstered public support for more civil rights legislation, even among white southerners. Following the brutal "Bloody Sunday" attack by Selma police on peaceful demonstrators, a Gallup poll indicated that 75 percent of respondents endorsed federal voting rights legislation.[7] By the time the Voting Rights Act was signed, civil rights seemed to have become a winning political issue. Historians Isserman and Kazin note the hopes of many Democrats that newly enfranchised Black voters could be combined with the party's existing supporters to strengthen the Democratic party.[8]

The new and improved Democratic coalition did not emerge. To the contrary, the 1960s marked the zenith of Liberalism. Across the country Republicans made inroads as the New Deal coalition unraveled. Ronald Reagan won a landslide victory in California's 1966 gubernatorial election, touting his law and order credentials and opposition to open housing laws and welfare. Richard Nixon took the presidency in 1968 on a similar platform, pledging to protect the interests of the so-called "silent majority" against crime, social unrest, and government favoritism of minorities. Four years after Goldwater had carried just six states, Nixon claimed the White House.

Indeed, evidence of cracks in the New Deal coalition was apparent in 1964. That year, many increasingly conservative voters "split their tickets," and voted for conservatives in the non-Presidential races.[9] For example, although Johnson won California, Democrats lost a Senate race to conservative Republican George Murphy. Nationally, a Gallup poll taken eight days after the election found Americans closely split between support for conservative and liberal policies.[10]

Given Johnson's victory, the Republican ascendancy of the late 1960s must have derived from more than a simple backlash against civil rights. In their recent book, Shafer and Johnston assert that contemporary economic trends in the South explain its political realignment. Before World War II, white southerners looked to the Democratic Party to preserve the status quo, believing that "anything that changed the agricultural nature of the economy would be inevitably and thoroughly disruptive to the larger society."[11] From 1903 until 1961, no Confederate state elected a Republican senator. The region's postwar transformation from an agrarian to an industrial society produced class divisions that mirrored those of the North. In turn, southern politics began to more resemble those of the rest of the country.[12] As southern society grew more heterogeneous, southerners thought less regionally and more personally in the voting booth, seeking political repre-

4 Jason Sokol, There Goes My Everything: White Southerners in the Age of Civil Rights, 1945-1975 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006), 210.

5 Ibid. 197.

6 Ibid. 196.

7 Maurice Isserman and Michael Kazin, America Divided: The Civil War of the 1960s, Third Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 142.

8 Ibid. 144.

9 Donaldson, 298.

10 Johnson, 302.

11 Byron E. Shafer and Richard Johnston, The End of Southern Exceptionalism: Class, Race, and Partisan Change in the Postwar South (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2006), 8.

12 Ibid. 12.

sentation that reflected their particular economic interests.

Beginning in the 1950s and accelerating in the 1960s, wealthier Southern whites increasingly voted Republican. By opposing social welfare measures and supporting lower taxes, Republicans appealed to the economic and social interests of the upwardly mobile. Democrats retained significant support among poorer whites while attracting new black voters en masse. Americans nationwide, more prosperous and optimistic about their economic futures, gravitated toward the Republican Party, while the Democratic Party associated itself with issues of poverty and social welfare. Further discounting the role of race in Republican gains, whites in areas with large black populations—who would presumably be more affected by civil rights legislation—consistently voted more Democratic than those in other areas.[13]

Shafer and Johnston's analysis correctly recognizes the national character and long-term origins of the Republican Party's resurgence, but its separation of economics and race ignores the confluence of these two factors. That partisan shifts were not unique to the South does not exclude race as the explanation, for race influenced northern politics as well. Backlash against civil rights legislation emanated less from the Jim Crow South than from a growing sense of white entitlement. White America came to view its post-war prosperity as natural and just. For many whites, government intervention in racial matters threatened the social standing they had won through their own hard work. The Republican platform of free market economics, law and order, and racial conservatism promised to defend the new status quo, especially from the intrusion of outside groups. By the mid-1960s, most southerners could see that white supremacy through legal discrimination was dead. Consequently, many joined the North in pursuing the institutionalization of white preeminence through less obvious economic means.

In the North, economics had long been a tool of racial subjugation. After World War II, local and federal governments advanced the interests of working and lower-middle class whites at the expense of blacks.

Agencies like the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) and Veteran's Administration (VA) subsidized millions of white Americans in entering home ownership. Whites migrated from urban centers to rapidly-developing suburbs. In addition, homeowner tax breaks and highway construction facilitated homeownership and suburbanization. Housing authorities adopted blatantly racist policies, often redlining black neighborhoods as too 'risky' for government loans.[14] As whites deserted cities, government funding and private investment followed. Thus, while whites enjoyed unprecedented prosperity, blacks were increasingly confined to neglected and blighted urban neighborhoods.

This new generation of upwardly-mobile whites sought to consolidate their gains. Convinced that their success derived wholly from the free market, they opposed civil rights legislation and racially progressive programs out of the belief that "civil rights for Blacks were won only at the expense of white rights."[15] White resistance toward integrated communities mixed traditional racial fears with identifiably middle class concerns and began to change local politics. In the 1949 Detroit mayoral election, Republican Albert Cobo defeated Democrat George Edwards, a council member of the New Deal tradition by opposing integrated neighborhoods and public housing. He swept the largely white precincts on the northeast and northwest sides.[16] Many of these voters would soon leave the city and become part of the suburban middle class. While New Deal programs like the FHA had elevated them to middle class standing, they soon became some of the New Deal's harshest adversaries in order to protect that status.

Similarly, middle class racial mentalities transformed politics in the South. Republican support between the 1950s and 1970s in Southern House races jumped eighteen points among white voters in the middle income tercile and twenty points among those in the upper income tercile. For the bottom tercile, Re-

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13 Ibid. 64.

14 Peter Dreier, John Mollenkopf, and Todd Swanstrom, Place Matters: Metropolitics for the Twenty-first Century (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2004), 122.

15 Thomas J. Sugrue, "Crabgrass-Roots Politics: Race, Rights, and the Reaction against Liberalism in the Urban North, 1940-1964," The Journal of American History 82 (1995): 561.

16 Ibid. 570-71.

> **That partisan shifts were not unique to the South does not exclude race as the explanation, for race influenced northern politics as well.**

publican support rose just six percent.[17] In presidential elections during this period, the Republican share of the vote among southern whites increased seventeen and nineteen points for the middle and upper income terciles, respectively, and thirteen points for the lower income tercile.[18] The overall trend is clear: higher-income whites drove the Republican Party's electoral improvement in the South.

The upper class gravitation to the Republican Party can be easily explained. Wealthy Southerners, like their Northern counterparts, naturally supported the party advocating low taxes, and higher-income voters consistently trended Republican.[19] The middle class's lurch to the right, however, requires deeper analysis. After all, many liberal achievements, including Social Security, Medicare, and consumer protections enjoy strong middle class support.

Ultimately, the factors responsible for this shift were the same as those active in Detroit. Kevin Kruse's White Flight: Atlanta and the Making of Modern Conservatism demonstrates how upwardly-mobile Atlantan whites embraced the Republican Party for reasons nearly identical to those of Northern whites. Believing them-

selves under siege by black intruders and government support for minorities, they formed homeowners' associations to demand "freedom of association" and protect residential homogeneity through racial covenants and public advocacy. This defense of racial privilege differed from the white supremacist approach of groups like the Ku Klux Klan and closely approximated Northern models. In Atlanta, anti-tax sentiment dominated the agenda, as white residents voiced their opposition to bearing the cost of services for blacks.[20]

The Republican Party appealed directly to the interests of middle class whites. By the mid-1960s, these voters were increasingly suburban. During the 1960s, 60,000 of roughly 300,000 whites abandoned Atlanta, followed by 100,000 in the next decade.[21] Bo Callaway offered a blueprint for Republican success in this new political environment, promising to defend the Atlanta suburbs from liberal solutions to racial problems. In the 1966 Georgia gubernatorial election, Callaway's strategy very nearly paid off, as only a technicality denied him victory. In the 1968 presidential election, Callaway served as Richard Nixon's southern campaign manager and applied these same principles throughout the region. Despite some rhetoric, Kruse argues that Nixon's southern strategy was not neo-segregationist, "it was, instead, an appeal to middle-class suburbanites."[22]

Although traditional loyalties and congressional Democrats' willingness to break party ranks on racial issues helped them retain majorities in the South, Republicans had established themselves as major players in Southern politics, with a solid base among white suburbanites. As Kruse documents, racial attitudes proved a central component of a new mentality of "social respectability," and politicians like Callaway and Blackburn, with their racially-charged rhetoric, understood that.

National political milestones accelerated these trends, none more so than the 1964 election. Although Goldwater was defeated, his views on racial issues laid the foundation for the national party to capitalize on

17 Shafer and Johnston, 25.

18 Ibid. 31.

19 Paul Krugman, comment on, "Income and voting," The Conscience of a Liberal, comment posted on October 22, 2007, http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/10/22/income-and-voting/ (accessed April 21, 2010).

20 Kevin Kruse, White Flight: Atlanta and the Making of Modern Conservatism (Princeton: Princeton University, Press, 2005), 127.

21 Ibid. 5.

22 Ibid. 253.

> **When withdrawing from the race on July 19th, he proclaimed: "being a Southerner is no longer geographic. It's a philosophy and an attitude."**

race in future elections. Prior to 1964, Republicans remained the party of emancipation and Reconstruction in the eyes of many. National Republicans were significantly more liberal on race than Democrats. When President Eisenhower pushed for a civil rights bill in 1957 to protect minority voting rights, then-Senator Johnson stripped the bill of its most controversial provision, involving strong legal protections for minorities. Indeed, the Civil Rights Act received the support of 80 percent of Republicans, compared to 69 percent of Senate Democrats and 63 percent of House Democrats.

Much of the credit for reviving civil rights as a national issue must go to the Democratic governor of Alabama, George Wallace, who ran for his party's presidential nomination in 1964. Although Wallace once proclaimed: "Segregation now! Segregation tomorrow! Segregation forever!"[23], his presidential campaign offered a more moderate racial conservatism. In this way, Wallace was to national politics what Bo Callaway was to southern politics. Wallace recognized that reimposing segregation or continuing to deny blacks suffrage was politically impossible. Instead, Wallace perfected the use of racial code words to appeal to white anxieties. He decried open housing, preferential treatment for

minorities, and school busing, and took advantage of a wave of urban riots in 1964 to play on white fears of residential integration and public housing. Wallace's message resonated well in the North, particularly in urban areas where blacks had begun to move into previously white neighborhoods. Wallace recognized the common chord his rhetoric struck with northern and southern audiences. When withdrawing from the race on July 19th, he proclaimed: "being a Southerner is no longer geographic. It's a philosophy and an attitude."[24]

Goldwater, an opponent of civil rights legislation on constitutional grounds, took note of Wallace's approach. Although at times uncomfortable with the racial edge of his 1964 campaign, the resonance of Wallace-like rhetoric convinced Goldwater to press the issue. As early as 1961, Goldwater had demonstrated he understood the shifting racial politics, remarking, "We're not going to get the Negro vote as a bloc in the 1964 and 1968, so we ought to go hunting where the ducks are."[25] The Goldwater campaign appealed to the racial anxieties of many white Americans. One ad featured a young white man fired from a job in favor of "an arrogant-looking Negro boy" as a result of the Civil Rights Act.[26] When campaigning alongside Strom Thurmond in the South, he drew massive crowds. .

Goldwater embraced Wallace's emphasis on law and order against the backdrop of campaign-year urban riots. They tapped into the fears of millions of whites that the violence on their television screens would spread to their backyards unless the government took action. By the Republican convention in July, even former President Eisenhower, who had been openly hostile to Goldwater's extremism in the past, came on board. Before the partisan crowd in San Francisco, he proclaimed, ""[L]et us not be guilty of maudlin sympathy for the criminal who, roaming the streets with switchblade knives and illegal firearms seeking a helpless prey, suddenly becomes upon apprehension a poor, underprivileged person who counts upon the compassion of our society and the laxness or weakness of too many

23 Donaldson, 95.

24 Ibid. 56.

25 Johnson, 28.

26 Ibid. 273.

courts to forgive his offense."[27] With that speech, Eisenhower represented the surrender of moderate Republicanism to the conservative movement he had opposed.[28]

It was Goldwater's victory over the moderate wing that positioned Republicans to profit from the anxieties of white America. Goldwater's emergence as the face of the party solidified its credentials as the defender of middle class suburban voters. During the debate over the Civil Rights Act, Rockefeller, Goldwater's primary opponent, enthused that Republican support for civil rights made "crystal clear the fact that the mainstream of Republican thought and action today remains true to our party's heritage and faithful to its deep conviction of the worth and dignity of each individual."[29] Had Rockefeller been nominated, the two major parties' candidates would have been two of the most prominent pro-civil rights politicians in the country. Goldwater's nomination, however, secured the decisive California primary by white upper- and middle-income suburbanites,[30] established a clear contrast with Johnson's racial progressivism. This blueprint provided a path to victory for a host of Republican politicians. Nixon would be the first to capitalize on this path with his southern strategy in 1968, but Reagan's victory in 1980 marked the true fulfillment of the Goldwater legacy. Conservative columnist George Will wrote, "It took 16 years to count the votes [of the 1964 election], and Goldwater won."[31]

Democratic policy and strategy in the 1960s provided a useful foil to Republican assertiveness on racial issues. Besides Democrats' association with civil rights legislation, ingrained in the American consciousness by the Goldwater-Johnson divide, Johnson's Great Society initiatives neatly fit the emerging Republican narrative. Republicans painted Democrats as soft on crime and as favoring higher taxes to facilitate wealth redistribution from hard-working (white) Americans to minority welfare recipients. Ironically, many middle class whites stood to benefit from the reforms although activist government and federal intervention in the economy became synonymous with preferential treatment for the undeserving poor. With initiatives such as Johnson's "war on poverty," the Democratic Party appeared to have abandoned the interests of white working Americans in favor of impoverished minorities for whom government assistance necessarily amounted to a handout.

The tumult of the 1960s worsened many whites' perceptions of minorities. As civil rights reforms failed to concretely improve blacks' quality of life, urban riots and violence broke out. The 1964 riots in Rochester and Philadelphia were followed by similar events in Watts, Newark, Detroit, and Chicago. In the face of such horrific images, most Americans had little appetite for trying to understand the root causes of inner-city violence. Sokol explains, "The Democratic Party not only passed epic civil rights legislation and waged a 'war on poverty,' but its policies appeared even worse in light of the recent riots. While liberals provided federal funds to the impoverished, poor urban dwellers seemed to be tearing down America's cities."[32] Even Michael Dukakis, the 1988 Democratic nominee for president, acknowledged that his party had not done enough to address Americans' concerns "that crime in neighborhoods and cities is up and people are getting terrorized and folks don't want to come out of the house."[33]

Republicans, having laid claim to the law-and-order mantel, upped the ante. In the 1968 presidential race, Richard Nixon made law and order the centerpiece of his campaign. He appealed to the so-called "silent majority" of Americans to great effect. 1968 marked a turning point in white voters' partisan preferences in presidential elections. Whereas Goldwater had lost white males and females by 11.8 and sixteen percentage points, respectively, Nixon carried white males by 14.1 percent and females by thirteen percent. In 1972, Nixon extended those advantages to 35.7 and 37.3 percent.[34]

27 Donaldson, 174.

28 Fred J. Cook, Barry Goldwater: Extremist of the Right (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1964), 131.

29 Johnson, 123.

30 Donaldson, 152.

31 Lawrence K. Pettit, If You Live by the Sword: Politics in the Making and Unmaking of a University President (Bloomington, Indiana: iUniverse, 2010), 67.

32 Sokol, 273.

33 David Paul Kuhn, The Neglected Voter: White Men and the Democratic Dilemma (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), 40.

34 Ibid. 1.

It would be easy to attribute such gains to a reaction against the domestic unrest that surged under Democratic stewardship of the federal government. Isserman and Kazin suggest that without the outbreak of explosive rioting in Watts five days after President Johnson signed the Voting Rights Act, the strengthened Democratic coalition may have held. Other explanations for the Democratic decline emphasize phenomena specific to the 1960s. The Vietnam War threw the Democratic Party into disarray. Leftist political movements and counterculture provoked a backlash against liberalism among culturally conservative Americans. Many Americans embraced Republican candidates' law and order platforms for non-racial reasons. In addition, an energized conservative movement mobilized against the liberalism of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, and the Civil Rights and Voting Rights Acts unquestionably led some to abandon the Democratic Party out of sheer racism.

To be sure, all of these variables played a role in the fragmentation of the Democratic Party. However, as the examples of Republican resurgence on the local level in the North and South demonstrate, the seeds of political realignment were in place long before the various crises of the 1960s. The commonly-cited factors above are necessary but not sufficient explanations. When Lyndon Johnson signed the Voting Rights Act, the pieces of a revitalized Democratic coalition seemed in place. Beneath these reassuring signs, however, the party faced a virtually inescapable demographic crisis. Americans might have come to accept full legal equality for blacks as inevitable and even just outcomes, but the economic and geographic transformations that took place after World War II pushed white Americans toward racial conservatism on questions like housing, crime, and school busing. As the national Democratic Party followed the legacy of President Truman and slowly established itself as the party of relative racial progressivism, Democrats found themselves increasingly estranged from the growing bloc of upwardly-mobile white Americans.

The only question that remained was whether Republicans could take advantage of the Democrats' dilemma. Despite one of their worst showings in a presidential election, they did. In that catastrophic 1964 election, clear signs of the resonance of Goldwater's platform among the white middle class came into focus, and race became a central tenet of subsequent Republican electoral strategy nationwide. In both the North and South, white Americans sought protection for their new middle-class status from the intrusion of outsiders and government. The Republican Party, first at the local and then at the national level, pivoted adroitly to assume that role. American politics was forever changed. ■

# Women on the Move

## The Impact of Female Leadership on Social Movement Membership and Participation

BY PRIYANKA R. DEV

### ABSTRACT

This paper will explore how female leadership in a social movement influences women's political participation—in both traditional and non-traditional forms. Its conclusions will determine whether feminine icons like Rosa Parks or Dolores Huerta impacted the way the average American woman responded to a movement's goals or tactics and where this impact was seen—in the voting booth or in the movement itself. I purport here that female social movement leaders cause an increase in female political participation both within the movement, particularly through the channels of protest and grassroots mobilization, as well as outside of the movement, through more conventional channels like voting.

### INTRODUCTION

Evelyn Yoshimura, Rosa Parks, and Dolores Fernández Huerta have at least one thing in common: as female leaders within American social movements, they shaped what it means to be a woman in this country. Some well-known and others seemingly forgotten, these female activists incite empowerment, evoke a sense of pride among women everywhere and serve as living proof that we must reassess how we understand the effects of gender on political participation.

This paper will explore how female leadership in a social movement influences women's political participation—in both traditional and non-traditional forms. It will determine whether feminine icons like Rosa Parks or Dolores Huerta impacted the way in which the average American woman responded to a movement's goals or tactics and where this impact was seen—in the voting booth and within the movement itself. This exploration of gender and social movement theory will focus on seemingly gender-less movements, like the Chicano Civil Rights and Asian American movements, since movements with gender-specific goals would likely confound the variables that play into the link between the women in a movement and the feminine response.

## LITERATURE REVIEW

Scholars of political science, sociology, and gender studies have intertwined the themes of gender, political participation, and social movement in various fashions. Taylor (1999) made precedent in linking gender and social movement theory, citing gender as a key explanatory factor for movement mobilization, leadership, strategies and ideologies.[1] Others criticize traditional social movement theory for failing to integrate cultural elements like gender ideology in its approach to explaining social movements.[2] For instance, Ulbig and Funk (1999) maintain that a woman's individual psychology towards conflict, a gendered element, plays a larger role in their propensity to participate politically than previous theories would allow for.[3] Traditional resource mobilization theorists often cite evidence that women's political participation depends more on the availability of political resources than extraneous factors like feminine leadership.[4]

Linking feminine leadership to participation, Burns et. al (2001) point out that "where and when women do run for political office, more females participate in the traditionally male political realm,"[5] and Robnett (1997) argues that female leaders fulfill "an intermediate layer of leadership, whose tasks include bridging potential constituents and adherents, as well as potential formal leaders, to the movement."[6] Baldez (2002) proposes the "Tipping, Timing and Framing" theory: women's participation in protest activities starts small, builds gradually and then suddenly reaches a critical mass of momentum. She proposes that mobilizing as women provides a rhetorical frame that permits women with diverse substantive interests to engage in collective action—which alludes to the fact that female leadership may mobilize those who would otherwise remain uninterested.[7]

Having women in prominent positions as part of a supposedly genderless social movement legitimizes both the movement's goals and its tactics in the eyes of the common woman; this common woman is then more likely to envision herself take part in such a movement, contribute time and effort towards a movement, or simply head to the voting booth. Women thus legitimate a social movement because of its feminine leadership figures, and are therefore more likely to participate politically themselves—since what they have seen not only empowers them as 'sisters' of the movement but also rationalizes their decision.

## CASE STUDY: THE CHICANO MOVEMENT (1965-1975)

Riding on the coattails of the African-American Civil Rights Movement, Mexican Americans, calling themselves Chicanos, embarked on their own demand for equal recognition under the law in the mid-1960s. This minority group capitalized on the "changing intellectual climate of America" to fight against the disadvantaged socioeconomic conditions, the heavy racial discrimination and the inherent social class stagnation they faced under the American system.[8] Moderates within the movement planned to work within the system to gain political power on the basis of cultural regeneration, while radicals fought to restructure the entire system to achieve the same goals.

In 1965, the United Farm Workers (UFW) strike in Delano, California, launched Hispanic farm workers into a five-year series of strikes and boycotts, serving as a catalyst for further movement activity. César Chávez, a "preeminent figure in the history of Mexican Ameri-

1  Verta Taylor, "Gender and Social Movements: Gender Processes in Women's Self-Help Movements," Gender and Society Vol. 13, No. 1 (Feb 1999), 8-33.

2  Rita K. Noonan, "Women against the state: Political opportunities and collective action frames in Chile's transition to democracy," Sociological Forum Vol. 10. No. 1 (March, 1995), 81-111.

3  Stacy G. Ulbig and Carolyn L. Funk, "Conflict Avoidance and Political Participation," Political Behavior Vol. 21. No. 3 (1999), 265-282

4  Kay Lehman Schlozman, Nancy Burns and Sidney Verba, "Gender and the Pathways to Participation: The Role of Resources," The Journal of Politics Vol. 56, No. 4 (Nov. 1994). 963-990.

5  Nancy Burns, Kay Lehman Schlozman and Sidney Verba, The private roots of public action: gender equality, and political participation (Boston: Harvard University Press, 2001).

6  Belinda Robnett, How long? How long?: The African-American women in the struggle for Civil Rights (London: Oxford University Press, 1997).

7  Lisa Baldez, Why Women Protest: Women's Movements in Chile (2002).

8 Manuel G. Gonzales, "The Chicano Movement: 1965-1975," Mexicanos: A History of Mexicans in the U.S. (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1999).

cans," came to the forefront of the Chicano movement with his leadership of the strike—though many criticize that he only saw turmoil and challenge up until his death in 1993.9 Women also emerged as leaders within this farm laborer movement since the family unit, a feminine concept, stood at the center of many of these issues; thus, leaders like Dolores Huerta rose to prominence.

Another early formidable push in leadership occurred with the rise of Reies López Tijerina, which culminated with his armed raid of the Tierra Amarilla courthouse in 1967. Taking on more militant tactics than Gandhi-like Chávez, Tijerina's push to recover Hispano lands lost during World War II "dramatize[d] the plight of the impoverished Hispano communities in New Mexico" and garnered national attention.10 Rodolfo Gonzalez was another proponent for the res-

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9   Ibid.

10   Ibid.

> "Women's participation in protest activities starts small, builds gradually and then suddenly reaches a critical mass of momentum.

toration of ancestral land, launching the first separatist Chicano political party, the Raza Unida Party, in 1970. Gonzalez was also known as the face of youth mobilization, and founded the Crusade for Justice, an organization focused on youth problems, in 1966. In the same vein, Jose Angel Gutierrez, one of the youngest leaders among the movement, started the Mexican American Youth Organization (MAYO) while still in college and later rose to the forefront in Chicano politics by founding El Partido de la Raza Unida (LRUP) in 1970, which later became a leading minority political party.

Throughout the 1970s, the Chicano movement saw its youth contingency rise in importance, with college students founding the Brown Berets, the most radical, militant wing of the movement—similar in nature to the Black Panthers of Black Civil Rights. This decade also brought about the Chicana movement, a feminine offshoot of the Chicano movement grounded in the belief that women were exploited within the original movement on the basis of gender and therefore deserved their own outlet for systemic demands. In what is reflected on as a great schism in the Chicano movement, Chicanas spoke out against Machismo (the notion of societal patriarchy), and strong women like Francisca Flores and Ramona Morín emerged as leaders.

Other such schisms emerged within the Mexican American movement, and La Causa soon faced widespread disinterest and growing divergence between moderate and radical ideologies. This, combined with the demise of charismatic leaders like Chávez and the financial problems brought about by the end of the Vietnam War in 1975, led to the downward spiral of the Chicano Movement by the end of the 1970s.

### THEORY

The presence of female leadership within a social movement has a ripple effect that propels women in the general American population into the political arena. Female social movement leaders cause an increase in female political participation both within the movement, particularly through the channels of protest and grassroots mobilization, as well as outside of the movement, through more conventional channels like voting.

The increase of female political participation within the movement occurs as a result of two phenomena: a unique feminine psychological bond and simple social reasoning. First, there is an inherent sense of trust among women that results from the historical bond of discrimination and common experience that they feel; this bond creates a sentiment of group solidarity strong enough to pull women into a movement when they previously may not have cared. Women often see other women as fellow strugglers, peers who have shared wrongs in the past and comrades who can and will face similar problems in the present and future. Because of this intrinsic bond, female leaders are better able to communicate with fellow women and harness women's interest; female leaders are thus able to make stronger appeals to women, and this psychological bond draws more women into the movement.

At the same time, a bandwagon effect occurs as a result of simple social reasoning. Female leaders often represent the most respected and idolized feminine figures of their time. Many women likely reason that if such figures are interested in the particular goals of a movement, then every woman should be vested in such goals as well. Thus, women on the fringe of a movement, or even those entirely uninterested in its goals, often hop on the movement's bandwagon, riding on the coattails of the female leadership.

It is important to note that though many modes of political action exist within a social movement, the increase in women's participation should be most apparent in protest activity and grassroots mobilization. Having females at the helm of a movement, working against the system for what they believe in, paints unconventional political participation as more acceptable. Female leadership, in short, increases the protest potential of both women who are new to a movement as well as those who are already participating in the movement but looking to change their mode of political action. Grassroots mobilization, a space within a movement typically dominated by females, likely also enjoys much of the increase in female participation that emerges under female leadership; if we assume that women will start participating in a sphere in which they feel most comfortable, it is logical that grassroots mobilization

will benefit from much of the increase.

Outside the movement itself, female leadership likely serves as a general model for challenging traditional feminine subordination and passivity—a model which many women, regardless of how they feel about a particular social movement, will follow in their capacity as social beings. By occupying a position of power within traditionally patriarchal power structures, female leaders legitimize the concept of women as political agents. Therefore, women in the general public feel an urge, based on the shared psychological bond, to contribute as active citizens, even if by voting alone. Seeing females lead a social movement creates a sense of political agency, or obligation, even for women who reject the movement's goals.

Patterns of female leadership and female participation through a phase of the Chicano Movement support this hypothesis.

### EVIDENCE AND APPROACH

According to this hypothesis, the analysis of a case study should show that female voter turnout, female's expressed political interest, and various forms of female political participation increased in the years following the emergence of a female political leader. A review of media coverage and analyses of survey data and Federal Census reports applied to the Chicano Movement can determine whether and in what ways female leaders of a movement impacted female political participation.

A review of media coverage helped isolate a single prominent female leader within the given movement, Chicanismo of the late 1960s. Dolores Huerta emerged as the most visible and public female leader, representative of female leadership. This finding was in accordance with a survey of the extent of media coverage of several females in the movement, using two parameters to assess the breadth and depth of coverage behind each leader; the breadth of coverage was measured by the number of 'hits' a particular name draws in The New York Times archive, and the depth of coverage was subjectively assessed based on the types of articles under each name as well as their level of detail. This media review also confirmed that American females

> **Female leadership, in short, increases the protest potential of both women who are new to a movement as well as those who are already participating in the movement**

were made aware of the chosen female figure, which is critical to this study.

Once a female figure was selected for analysis, the time periods within her tenure of leadership were chosen based on the aforementioned media coverage review. Reports showed that Huerta received the greatest amount of press attention during the Delano Grape Strike of 1965; therefore, an analysis of female attitudes and political participation in 1962—which predates the Delano strike and Huerta's acclaim—compared to female attitudes and political participation in 1966—which immediately follows the events that popularized this social movement leader – should be most telling. It should also be noted that congressional elections took place within each of these time periods.

Determinations of female political interest, attitudes, and reported political participation in these two years were based on survey data from American National Election Studies (ANES).11 Since the survey questions are not standardized between the two years of analysis, numerous other indicators of female political interest and political participation were also utilized in order to show that women in 1966 had a greater interest in politics and were more likely to protest, vote, and mobilize others at an informal level than those in 1962.

Lastly, the 1966 Federal Census Report provides information on the nationally-reported female voter turnout in 1966, which is crucial to this analysis.12 Unfortunately, the Federal Census Report of 1962 fails to provide the same data because of less-advanced reporting mechanisms used. Thus, the female voter turnout statistic for 1962 used in this study was taken from ANES data, which is self-reported and survey-driven rather than sanctioned by the federal government.

### RESULTS: Media Coverage Review 13

Breadth analysis showed that Huerta, founder of United Farm Workers of America and co-leader of the Delano strike, received eight hits in the given time period, the greatest number of the females surveyed. Searches for the names Teresa Urrea, Emma Tenayuca, Josefina Fierro and Luisa Moreno also emerged with hits, but these four figures received a mere seven hits combined. Depth analysis showed that the articles on Huerta covered the themes most relevant to her leadership as a female, specifically pointing to her role in the United Farm Workers of America, the AFL-CIO and the Democratic Socialist Party. Since three of the eight articles covered the famous 1965 strike on grape farms in Delano, Texas, that was led by Huertas, this event served

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11 The American National Election Studies, The ANES Guide to Public Opinion and Electoral Behavior. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan, Center for Political Studies. Available at www.election-studies.org.

12 U.S. Census Bureau, Profile of selected social characteristics: United States (1966).

13  Appendix 1.

as the chronological point of reference for the survey data analysis that follows.

## RESULTS: ANES Survey Data Analysis for General Female Population14

American National Election Studies survey data shows that general female political interest and participation increased between the years of 1962 and 1966, the two years selected to serve as data parameters around the 1965 strike. The first indicator of this trend is seen in female's reported interest in or following of politics: in 1962 only 53.94% reported that they follow politics "very" or "fairly closely" while in 1966, 64.09% reported that they "know politics" most or some of the time. This nearly-ten-percent increase demonstrates that more females were interested in politics in 1966 than in 1962. This indicates a sense of feminine empowerment, which is arguably the result of Huerta's work and the media coverage surrounding the strike she led; based on these results, it is evident that Huerta legitimized the fundamental role of the female in not only the social movement but also in the political arena.

There is also a marked increase in actual political participation between the two time periods. In 1962, only 20.76% reportedly "talked to people about politics" while a meager 8.94% contributed money to a campaign and 8.33% attended a political meeting or rally. Survey data for 1966 shows a significant increase in these types of participation, both formal and informal: nearly one-fourth of women reported they would work through an informal group to challenge an unjust regulation and more than 30% reported they would take independent action, such as writing to a Congressman or making a phone call, to challenge injustice. Though only 1.67% of women reported that they would participate in a non-violent protest or demonstration in 1966, this question did not even appear on the survey in 1962—which may indicate that more people associated protest with a legitimate form of participation in the latter year.

While the altered survey questions make direct comparisons difficult, the general sentiment towards concrete participation as well as psychological-based

interest increased after Huerta led the 1965 strike in Delano.

## RESULTS: ANES Survey Data Analysis for Hispanic Female Population15

What is not reflected in the results above is the direction of this increased female participation. In order to prove that female participation could have been the result of the Chicano movement, specifically Dolores Huerta, the changing political attitudes and participation of Hispanic Females was specifically tracked in the given time parameters. The changes seen among this particular subset were even greater than the differences within the general female population. This indicates that increased female participation is likely linked to Hispanic interests, or the Chicano Movement.

While those reporting an interest in politics only increased by ten percent among the general female population, it increased by 26.92% among Hispanic females. The same trend follows for reported political participation: while only 12.50% of Hispanic females reportedly talked to people about politics in 1962, numbers surrounding political action spiked in 1966. In the latter year, one-fourth of Hispanic women reported they would work through an informal group to challenge an unjust regulation and a striking 62.50% reported that they would pursue independent political action. It is evident that Hispanic females became more interested in politics than females in general did, which may indicate that Chicano interests—particularly the 1965 strike— were somehow related to the increases in participation witnessed across the board.

## RESULTS: Female Voter Turnout16

It is evident, based on ANES voter turnout (which relies on self-reporting), that female voter turnout increased after the 1965 strike. Female voter turnout was only 31.25% in 1962, increasing by 30% to 62.27% in 1966. This latter figure, though it differs from that found in Census Data − which reports that 53% of females voted in 1966 − still aligns with the evidence that there

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14  Appendix 2

15  Appendix 3.

16  Appendix 4.

was a general increase in female political participation, especially in the voting booth, during the time period analyzed.

CONCLUSION

These findings point to an increase in general female political interest, participation and voting as well as an increase specifically in Hispanic female political interest and participation between the two years analyzed. While these findings fall in line with the theory outlined above, they beg the question: Is this data sufficient to prove that female leaders of social movements generally cause an increase in female participation within as well as outside of the movement?

Unfortunately, though this data supports the theory, it is inconclusive due to a number of confounding variables, the nature of the data collected and the limitations of this data. Confounding variables include many of the other simultaneous movements that were occurring in the 1962-1966 timeframe, which was ultimately selected due to the limited ANES data collection. During this timeframe, for instance, The Voting Rights Act of 1965 and the Civil Rights Act of 1964—both high points of the African-American Civil Rights Movement— were passed. The Asian-American Civil Rights Movement, which peaked in the 1970s, was also launched in the middle of the 1960s, contributing additional factors that may explain the rise in female political participation as reported by these findings. Though the evidence shows that Hispanic females reported an even larger spike in political participation than was seen among the female population as a whole, this sample size was based on a total of eight respondents—virtually nullifying the validity of any analysis of this dataset. It is therefore difficult to link these findings with the political effects of Chicano movement, and especially with Dolores Huerta specifically.

The data does not demonstrate that only female political participation increased between 1962 and 1966; one could therefore argue that political participation in general increased due to some other confounding variable that had little or nothing to do with female leadership in the Chicano movement. Even if there was evidence that linked this increased participation specifically to the 1965 Delano strike of the Chicano movement, there is no way to prove that Dolores Huerta was the specific cause for this increase. Thus, the causal link required to prove the theory, that connects Dolores Huerta directly to increased female participation both within and outside of the movement, is weak.

Another limitation stems from the data sources available. The ANES was one of few sources about the years in question and therefore dictated the terms of the research conducted here. The survey questions changed dramatically and also increased both in scope and detail between 1962 and 1966, which reduced the research control and likely skewed this analysis.

In proving this theory, the lack of data content for the given time periods proved to be an additional limitation. For instance, there was no data specific enough to address protest potential or attitudes towards protest in either year. Similar analysis should be performed on a more recent social movement with more thorough data sets in order to resolve this issue at length.

Though the data presented here does not conclusively prove the theory, it certainly aligns with the notion that females at the helm of a social movement can motivate women to political action. What is found here constitutes a good initial overview of this notion, though additional and more sophisticated research is necessary in order to prove that female leadership in social movements played a role in these trends. The data presented here would be a good starting point upon which to conduct a regression analysis that would account for the various confounding factors that play into these participatory increases. Perhaps a more expansive review of other social movements in addition to the Chicano movement would prove an indisputable trend among various types of social movements and time periods. More recent social movements may be a good place to begin, since data quality will likely be richer, with more potential sources as well as more detailed and controlled parameters. ■

APPENDIX 1
MEDIA COVERAGE REVIEW: THE NEW YORK TIMES ARCHIVE

| Female Leader Name | Breadth (# Hits between 1851-Present) | Depth (Description of Article Content) |
|---|---|---|
| Francisca Flores | 0 | n/a |
| Teresa Urrea | 4 | Family history, personal life, "Mexican revolutionist", reviews of biographical novels |
| Luisa Garfias | 0 | Only includes coverage of husband, former Mexican President |
| Emma Tenayuca | 1 | Voice behind 1937 San Antonio Sit-down |
| Dolores Huerta | 8 | News coverage of 1965 Delano grape strike, biographical information, voice of United Farm Workers of America, AFL-CIO (UFW) and Democratic Socialist Party |
| Josefina Fierro | 1 | Leader of Congreso del Pueblo de Habla Español— book review |
| Francisca Esparza | 0 | n/a |
| Rosaura Valdez | 0 | n/a |
| Luisa Moreno | 1 | Organizer of Congreso del Pueblo de Habla Español—book review |
| Rosa Florez | 0 | n/a |
| Manuela Reyes | 0 | n/a |

APPENDIX 2
AMERICAN NATIONAL ELECTION STUDIES – FEMALE RESPONDENTS

| 1962 Variable | 1962 | | 1966 Variable | 1966 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Female Respondents/Total Respondents | 54.28% | | Female Respondents/Total Respondents | 54.50% |
| Follow Politics Very or Fairly Closely | 53.94% | | Know Politics Most or Some of the Time | 64.09% |
| | | | Very Much or Somewhat Interested in Political Campaigning | 68.94% |
| | | | Favorable to Very Favorable Feelings towards Labor Unions | 51.82% |
| | | | Feel like "people like them" have some or a great deal of political power | 40.61% |
| Reportedly talked to people about politics | 20.76% | 1965 Grape Strike | Would work through informal group to challenge unjust regulation | 22.42% |
| Reportedly contributed monetarily to a political campaign | 8.94% | | Would work through independent action with government to challenge unjust regulation | 35.15% |
| Attended a political meeting or rally | 8.33% | | Would work through judicial means to challenge unjust regulation | 1.36% |
| | | | Would vote to challenge unjust regulation | 2.27% |
| Participated in a Political Club or Organization | 2.42% | | Would participate in non-violent protest or demonstration to challenge unjust regulation | 1.67% |
| | | | Very Likely to Actually Do Something about an Unjust Law | 17.58% |
| | | | Somewhat Likely to Actually Do something about an Unjust Law | 27.27% |

APPENDIX 3
AMERICAN NATIONAL ELECTION SURVEY - HISPANIC FEMALE RESPONDENTS

| 1962 Variable | 1962 | | 1966 Variable | 1966 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Hispanic Females*/Total Females | 1.21% | | Hispanic Females*/ Total Females | 1.97% |
| | | | | |
| Follow Politics Very or Fairly Closely | 50.00% | | Know Politics Most or Some of the Time | 76.92% |
| | | | Very Much or Somewhat Interested in Political Campaigning | 38.46% |
| | | | Favorable to Very Favorable Feelings towards Labor Unions | 46.15% |
| | | | Feel like "people like them" have some or a great deal of political power | 46.15% |
| Reportedly talked to people about politics | 12.50% | 1965 Delano Grape Strike | Would work through informal group to challenge unjust regulation | 25.00% |
| Reportedly contributed monetarily to a political campaign | 0% | | Would work through independent action with government to challenge unjust regulation | 62.50% |
| Attended a political meeting or rally | 0% | | Would work through judicial means to challenge unjust regulation | 0% |
| | | | Would vote to challenge unjust regulation | 0% |
| Participated in a Political Club or Organization | 0% | | Would participate in non-violent protest or demonstration to challenge unjust regulation | 0% |
| | | | Very Likely to Actually Do Something about an Unjust Law | 12.50% |
| | | | Somewhat Likely to Actually Do something about an Unjust Law | 62.50% |

* 1962 ANES race category includes "Other, including Mexican, Puerto Rican" while 1966 ANES race category includes separate denotations for "Puerto Rican" and "Mexican".

| ANES Data 1962* | 31.25% | 1965 Delano Grape Strike | ANES Data 1966* | 62.27% |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | 1966 Census Data** | 53.00% |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |

\* 1962 Survey Question ("Do you remember if you voted in 1962 election?") with potential positive responses of "Yes, definitely" or "Yes, I think so" differed from 1966 Survey Question ("Did you vote in 1966 Election?") with potential responses of "Yes" and "No"

\** 1962 Census Data regarding voter turnout by gender is unavailable

# American Political Culture

## How Ascriptive Hierarchies Have Reflected Social Identities

BY ANGELA KATRINA FERIA

Freedom and equality, the same ideologies that once drew a multitude of immigrants to the United States, continue to lure men and women to her shores today. But America, a beacon of freedom and democracy, remains limited by a political culture that is both reflected in and influenced by ascriptive hierarchies. Class, gender and racial differences are most tangibly evident in the political sphere, threatening the very principles upon which this country was once founded. While this notion is a broad one, surely worthy of further examination, this study focuses on the limited but instructive subset of immigrants. The immigrant experience is, surely, a story that exemplifies the struggles and limitations within the democracy that governs. Critical examination of works by Rogers Smith, James Morone, Samuel Huntington and Francis Fukuyama illustrates that while biases surely exist, sensitivity to ascriptive hierarchies has improved over time. As key legislation improved the lives of various immigrant groups, so too did it improve society's perceptions. Despite this progress,

changes in the socio-political landscape have created several serious new struggles that remain to this day.

In "The Multiple Traditions in America," Rogers Smith argues that there are inegalitarian ideologies that define the political status of racial and ethnic minorities. Smith contends that Tocqueville's thesis that America was built by egalitarian and free ideologies is inadequate and narrow. Perhaps relative to the feudalistic and aristocratic ideologies in European nations, America did appear "remarkably egalitarian by comparison."[1] After all, there was no hereditary monarchy or nobility native to British America. However, the multiple traditions inherent in a population of immigrants came along with religious, racial, gender and cultural inequalities. For instance, Americans of Northern European descent "embraced a strict, hierarchical world view based on skin color. At the top were the superior

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1 Smith, R. (1993). The Multiple Traditions in America. In the American Political Science Review (Vol. 87 No. 3).

Anglo-Saxons, followed by the Germans. Next came the Slavs, then followed by the Latin peoples from Europe. Further down were the Jews, Asians and at the very bottom, Africans."[2] This view suggests the prevalence of strict racial and ethnic hierarchies.

Historically, Americans saw foreigners as savage and inferior. Anglo-Saxon Americans, for instance, saw the Germans as a threat to American values, culture and traditions. They were characterized as "aggressive, brutal, militaristic, and autocratic."[3] The Chinese were "cruel, cunning and savage,"[4] considered "a constant and terrible menace to society."[5] Italians, on the other hand, were "gross little aliens who lacked the power to take rational care of themselves."[6] Anglo-Americans, on the other hand, separated themselves from all other nations by a feeling of pride and superiority, believing themselves to be "a distinct species of mankind."[7] Official titles and explicit notions of nobility may not have existed, but natural aristocracy strengthened the political power of the Anglo-American over other immigrant groups.

Racial prejudices became especially evident in the political realm. The Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 provide a blatant example of the perpetuation of such ascriptive inequality through the legislative system. The law, which allowed the government to deport and question foreigners without evidence or warrant, was later deemed unconstitutional, having violated individual rights – as Thomas Jefferson and James Madison so fervently argued. Jefferson and Madison were responsible for the drafting of the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions that attacked the legitimacy of the legislation. The acts, they argued, violated immigrants' rights to "a public trial by an impartial jury, to be informed of the na-

> " **Historically, Americans saw foreigners as savage and inferior...The Chinese were "cruel, cunning and savage,"... Italians, on the other hand, were "gross little aliens who lacked the power to take rational care of themselves."**

ture and cause of accusation, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense."[8] While the law ultimately disavowed the Alien and Sedition Acts, as Jefferson and Madison insisted, the prevalence of such anti-immigrant, anti-nonwhite legislation throughout history confirms that the law has not worked in the interests of immigrant groups. The American legal system has, in fact, actively served to marginalize and disenfranchise immigrant groups throughout critical moments in history.

Eventually, though, increased political inclusion and participation for immigrants emerged and ascriptive hierarchies became less evident. The Jacksonian period in particular saw the amelioration of the severe inequalities that had characterized the previous decades. Throughout the 1830s, social, political and legal conceptions of citizenship ultimately expanded to include immigrants, like the Irish. Through the 14th, 15th and 19th amendments to the Constitution, fundamental rights for all minorities were extended and protected by the U.S. government, despite opposition from nativists.

2 Hunt, M. (1987). Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy. (pp. 78-9). New Haven and Connecticut: Yale University Press.

3 Ibid.

4 Riis as cited in Morone, J. (1996). The Struggle for American Culture. PS: Political Science and Politics (p. 428).

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid.

7 Tocqueville as cited in Caldwell, W. (2006). American Narcissism: The Myth of National Superiority. New York: Algora Publishing.

8 Madison and Jefferson as cited in Kramnick in Lowi. (2009). Democracy and the Union, 1791-1865., American Political Thought: A Norton Anthology. (p. 377). U.S.A.: W.W. Norton and Company.

Critical legislation to strengthen non-discriminatory practices emerged. The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) was one – making it illegal for an employer to discriminate with respect to hiring, firing, recruitment or referral for a fee based upon an individual's citizenship.[9] Despite this progress, changing inherent biases and influencing actual day-to-day practices proved to be a tougher battle.

Significant progress was made on this front by the end of the 21st century, but the tragic events of September 11, 2001 ignited a drastic change in attitudes and policies. Media attention surrounding the "War on Terror" that followed served to exacerbate stereotypes by implicitly identifying certain groups of immigrants – specifically those from Arab or Islamic nations – with 'the terrorist enemy.' What resulted was "sub-civilizations," like those predicted by scholar Samuel Huntington in his prolific "The Clash of Civilizations." Huntington affirms the intensity of inevitable conflict between different civilizations, namely the West and Islamic states:

> Conflicts between groups in different civilizations will be more frequent, more sustained and more violent than conflicts between groups in the same civilization; violent conflicts between groups in different civilizations are the most likely and most dangerous source of escalation that could lead to global wars... a central focus of conflict for the immediate future will be between the West and several Islamic-Confucian states.[10]

But while Huntington's predictions certainly did prove true to some extent, his work fails to address the divisions that inherently arise within – not only between – civilizations. Within "the West," America specifically, controversial policies like the Patriot Act drove wedges through the electorate. Scholar Francis Fukuyama points to the most common of arguments made by Americans: "that the root cause of Islamist extremism was the lack of democracy in the Arab Middle East."[11] But Fukuyama refutes this argument as overly simplistic and inaccurate, attributing the radicalism responsible for the September 11th attacks instead to the inability of these immigrants to properly assimilate into Western culture.[12] Citizens of Middle Eastern nations, he argues, had migrated to the United States because it was perceived to be a land of equality and opportunity. Instead, they encountered a nation organized by well-defined hierarchies based on skin color rather than a nation free from such prejudices.

Inherent biases and inequalities based on ascribed group characteristics continue to exist in the United States. Analysis by Rogers Smith shows that "for over 80% of United States history, its laws declared most of the world's population to be ineligible for full American citizenship solely because of their race, original nationality, or gender."[13] Today, even as legal protections for immigrations improve, new struggles have replaced one ones. The fact is, the presence of racially and ethnically distinct immigrant groups will continue to influence the lives and politics of American society – and increasingly so. Rather than allowing politics to reflect damaging ascriptive hierarchies, Americans must look past these inherent differences and work towards strengthening the American identity as a whole. ■

9 Immigration Reform and Control Act. (n.d.). In US Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Retrieved from http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/nationalorigin.cfm

10 Huntington, S. (1993). The Changing Security Environment and American National Interests. In Olin Institute (p. 17).

11 Fukuyama, F. (2006) The Clash of Cultures and American Hegemony. The American Interest Online. Retrieved from http://www.the-american-interest.com/contents.cfm?MId=5

12 Ibid.

13 Smith, R. ( 1993). The Multiple Traditions in America. In the American Political Science Review (Vol. 87 No. 3, p. 37).

# A Tale of Two Cities and Other Stories

## Profiles and Studies in Georgia's 10th Congressional District

BY EMERSON T. BROOKING

### INTRODUCTION

Georgia's 10th Congressional District seems an unlikely candidate for this kind of profile. No earth-shattering political event has occurred here. The 10th is not a battleground district, and is in no danger of becoming one anytime soon. To most observers, GA-10 represents a convenient stereotype: white, rural, and overwhelmingly conservative. While none of these labels are inaccurate, their use belies the complex narratives to be found in the district. The 10th is more than the sum of its parts, and more than overdue for this type of analysis.

This profile is divided into two sections. The first offers an examination of the 10th as it exists today. Over the course of a dozen pages, you will become acquainted with the district's particular geography and population distribution. You will study elements of local demography and learn to appreciate them in state and federal contexts. You will determine the ideology of area residents and consider many of the beliefs they hold in common. Finally, you will embark on a whirlwind tour of the political history of the 10th, concluding your journey by paying serious thought to the district's present electoral dynamic. For the first time, statistics from the census and congressional studies are joined by extensive opinion polling from the National Annenberg Election Survey (NAES). While the data set remains far from comprehensive, new conclusions that emerge – that of a heterogeneous district beset by metropolitan tensions and unusually passionate voters – should allay more "conventional" conceptions of GA-10.

The second part of this paper seeks to present

compelling case studies focused on the presentational styles and electoral outcomes of two recent district representatives. One such representative, Congressman Don Johnson, was the last Democrat to serve the 10th. Through his determination to retain a level of policy independence, Johnson was defeated by the largest margin of any Democrat in 1994's Republican rout. Meanwhile, the other study focuses on current Republican Congressman Paul Broun. It assesses his unique, frequently controversial public persona, and queries what effect – if any – this national infamy has had on his campaign success. Conclusions from Part I, as well as qualitative metrics pioneered in Richard Fenno's Home Style, are used to great effect in these case studies.

No matter your current knowledge of Georgia politics, the sincere hope is that you conclude this paper having grown to better understand – and better appreciate – one of the 435 distinct pieces that compose our nation.

## PART I: THE PROFILE

## Geography

GA-10 comprises a long, vertical swath of land which envelops the northeastern corner of the state.[1] The district's uppermost counties border North Carolina, nestled comfortably in the foothills of the Appalachians. These northern reaches are mountainous and remote. As one travels southward, the landscape becomes progressively hotter and flatter and the countryside appears more akin to traditional images of southern farming communities. To the west lies the vast metropolitan sprawl of Atlanta; to the east, endless miles of coastline and South Carolina border. The district as a whole is impressively large, spanning 21 counties and 6,061 square miles.[2] GA-10 shares the same uneven shape common to all gerrymandered districts, and the span between its northernmost and southernmost points runs approximately 130 miles.[3]

## Demography

Roughly half of GA-10's 700,000 residents reside outside of metropolitan areas, making it the second most rural district in the state.[4] Accordingly, agriculture is a crucial district mainstay, and the 10th demonstrates particularly strong representation among cattle, corn, and soybean interests.[5] There are only two cities of significant size. The first city center, Athens-Clarke, boasts a population of just over 100,000.[6] It is home to the University of Georgia, itself the largest institute of higher learning in the state which enrolls 35,000 students annually.[7] Not surprisingly, Athens-Clarke also performs as the most consistently liberal region in the district.[8] The second city center is Augusta-Richmond, holding approximately 80,000 people.[9] The element that remains is largely conservative, striking a clear contrast with the left-leaning politics of Athens-Clarke. Both cities are located in the southern half of the district. This creates an uneven pattern of population distribution in which the north remains more sparely occupied and politically isolated.

The inhabitants of Georgia's 10th trend poorer and less educated than the nation as a whole. The 2007 median income in the 10th was $42,092, compared to $50,233 nationally.[10] Meanwhile, almost 17% of district respondents reported living below the poverty line, as opposed to 12.5% for the nation at large. Also indicative are differences in education level. Fully 15% of GA-10 residents voluntarily report having received only a partial high school or grade school education, as opposed to 9% nationally.[11] This gap is only exacerbated further at the higher strata of education; for instance, half as

1 "Congressional District GA-10," NationalAtlas.gov.

2 Michael Barone, The Almanac of American Politics 2010 (University of Chicago Press, 2009), 444.

3 "Congressional District GA-10," NationalAtlas.gov.

4 Chuck McCutcheon and Christinia Lyons, Politics in America: the 111th Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Inc, 2009), 268.

5 Ibid, 294.

6 Ibid.

7 University of Georgia Official Website, http://www.uga.edu.

8 Georgia Secretary of State Election Results, "2008 Vote Totals by County: District 10," http://www.sos.georgia.gov/elections.

9 McCutcheon and Lyons, Politics in America, 294.

10 Ibid.

11 Appendix 2, "Reported Level of Education, GA-10 and National."

> " **The moniker "liberal" is treated like a dirty word, and if respondents have left-leaning tendencies, they seem unwilling to vocalize them.**

many district residents report having obtained a graduate or professional degree as compared to the national average.[12]

GA-10 enjoys a racial distribution more diverse than the country at large, a fact that would seem to countermand stereotypes of southern white exclusivity. Only 73% of district residents are white, compared to nearly 80% of the nation in aggregate.[13] Similarly, GA-10 possesses a 20% black population, compared to only 13% nationwide. Hispanic and Asian district minorities, however, lag slightly behind the country as a whole. While these figures do not depart significantly from their national averages, their discovery should still be surprising for those accustomed to considering the 10th a vastly white-majority district.[14]

That said, the 10th still faces grave racial challenges. Outside of a few metropolitan centers, black voter registration is almost nonexistent.[15] Furthermore, despite enjoying a racial composition close to the state median, GA-10 cast the second lowest vote total

for Barack Obama out of all thirteen congressional districts.[16] Residents of the 10th accorded Obama only marginally more votes than Kerry before him, during an election year in which Obama drastically outperformed Kerry statewide.[17] This is a conspicuous inconsistency, and while it is empirically difficult to prove a racial voting motivation, such seems within the realm of possibility.

## Ideology

Ideology is a difficult category to assess, particularly on the district level. Sample sizes are relatively minute, while conclusions are difficult to defend. However, a study of general ideology can produce insights not afforded by registration numbers or vote tallies alone. Thanks to the substantial size of the 2004 NAES, it is possible to construct a statistically significant subset of district respondents. While much of this data was more directly relevant to the 2004 election, the rise of the Tea Party movement and renewed conservative populism suggests these figures may now be more applicable now than any time since 2008's Democratic rout. Regardless, this data is still valuable in drawing wider (and less time-sensitive) inferences about the ideology and beliefs of GA-10 residents.

It should come as little surprise that 10th respondents overwhelmingly self-identify as conservative. Moreover, many do so with a passion that outstrips the national average. Over 12% of district respondents consider themselves "Very Conservative," compared to 8% nationally.[18] When both "Very Conservative" and "Conservative" classifications are considered, fully 55% of GA-10 residents self-identify with this category, as opposed to 37% nationwide. Adding "Moderate" to the mix accounts for 89% of district respondents and 75% of the country at large. In every case, conservative self-identification far outperforms those considering themselves either "Liberal" or "Very Liberal." The moniker "liberal" is treated like a dirty word, and if respondents have left-leaning tendencies, they seem unwilling to vo-

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12 Ibid.

13 Barone, The Almanac of American Politics 2010, 444.

14 McCutcheon and Lyons, Politics in America, 268.

15 Georgia Secretary of State Election Results, "2008 Turnout by Demographic: District 10," http://www.sos.georgia.gov/elections.

16 McCutcheon and Lyons, Politics in America, 268.

17 Barone, The Almanac of American Politics, 414; 444.

18 Appendix 3, "Reported Ideological Identification, GA-10 and National."

calize them.  Even in GA-10, Kerry ultimately received 35% of the vote in an election in which only 11% of respondents were comfortable with an explicitly liberal self-identification.[19]

Under a Republican presidency (and prior to the crash of 2008), residents of the 10th show remarkable faith in their economy.  Despite generally skittish attitudes toward big government, only 21.5% of GA-10 respondents consider the state of the economy "Poor," as opposed to 29% of the national aggregate.[20]  That said, residents of the 10th also demonstrate a heightened concern for tax policy and income protection, a fact which could likely be considered a catalyst for current Tea Party sentiments.  When individuals are asked (fairly noncontroversially) whether taxes should be reduced, 66% of district respondents "Strongly Favor" this course of action, while 49% do so nationally.[21]  Upon combining the "Strongly Favor" and "Somewhat Favor" categories, however, 80% of GA-10 residents are shown to take this view, as opposed to 70% on the national level.  The critical divergence between district and national respondents is not in the answer to the issue (most people would like to see reduced taxes), but rather in the passion with which the problem is met.

Contrasting views on the Iraq War finds a scenario in which GA-10 and the nation at large part ways entirely.  This is no case of agreement by degree.  Rather, 60% of district respondents believe that the Iraq War "was worth it," while only 46% of national respondents feel the same way.[22]  This incongruence is important, but difficult to adequately explain.  Perhaps this figure marks another expression of the fierce conviction that residents of the 10th have demonstrated in many of these ideological issues.  Perhaps, also, this statistic can be attributed to the strong martial tradition which has long characterized the rural south.  Further evidence of sharp national security awareness can be found in answers to the question of which presidential candidate voters trust more to handle terrorism issues.  Although

both district and national respondents place their faith in President Bush, citizens of the 10th cite Bush 67% of the time  − 15% more than the nation as a whole, further demonstrating the unapologetic and passionate conservatism of the 10th's citizens.[23]

## Politics

GA-10 has undergone a radical electoral transformation over the last twenty years which mirrors that of the state as a whole.  As late as 1960, Georgia cast the second-highest Democratic presidential vote of any state in the union.[24]  After the 1965 Voting Rights Act and in the years following, however, state Democrats have seen a slow and steady decline.  Bill Clinton barely won Georgia in 1992 − by a hair-splitting vote of 43.5% to 42.9%, undeniably aided by Ross Perot's candidacy − and he was the last Democrat to do so.[25]  Bob Dole won Georgia by one point (47% to 46%) in 1996, and this pattern has accelerated rapidly thereafter.  Bush carried the state 55% - 43% in 2000, and 58% - 41% in 2004.[26] While McCain prevailed by a lesser 52% - 47% in 2008, he still managed to secure a clear victory in an election year where Obama turned several red states a new and unexpected shade of purple. According to Michael Barone, "The memory of William Tecumseh Sherman is dead," and Georgia will remain Republican for a long time coming.[27]

GA-10's choice of congressional representative has been consistently Republican, usually by overwhelming margins.  Following Democrat Don Johnson's stunning, 31-point defeat in 1994 (see Part II, Case Study A), the 10th has been in little danger of losing its designation as a safely Republican seat.[28]  Republican Charlie Norwood won this area (not "district," as he was briefly redrawn into GA-9) in six consecutive elections, and barring a close contest in 1996, his opponent never

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19 Barone, The Almanac of American Politics, 414; 444.

20 Appendix 4, "Country's Economy Today, GA-10 and National."

21 Appendix 5, "Favor Reducing Taxes, GA-10 and National."

22 Appendix 6, "Iraq War Was Worth It, GA-10 and National."

23 Appendix 7, "Trust Bush or Kerry on Terrorism, GA-10 and National."

24 Barone, The Almanac of American Politics 2010, 411.

25 Ibid, 413.

26 Ibid, 414.

27 Ibid, 413.

28 Ibid.

> **Once someone gains the trust of the 10th, it is difficult to lose it again.**

succeeded in garnering more than 40% of the vote.[29] Norwood passed away in early 2007, yet his successor, Republican Paul Broun (see Part II, Case Study B), won by a similarly commanding margin in his first general election of 2008. Broun's victory is especially significant in that he was a freshman lawmaker challenged by a conservative Iraq War veteran during a year in which Democrats swept the polls nationally. GA-10 currently holds a Cook Partisan Voting Index of R +15.[30] Such partisanship has infected local politics as well: where the vast majority of local races once took place in contested Democratic primaries, candidates now scramble to portray themselves as "good Republicans."[31]

The 10th offers two interesting campaign dynamics. The first involves the clear dichotomy between the northern and southern halves of the district. The north is sparsely populated and geographically isolated. The south, meanwhile, boasts nearly all of the district's meaningful population centers. This kind of heterogonous composition is a campaigner's nightmare.[32] Not only will northern voters be more difficult to reach, but it will likely be harder to pinpoint experiences they hold in common with their southern neighbors. Meanwhile, GA-10's campaign environment also suggests a unique rivalry between Athens and Augusta. In the past two Republican contests – the 2007 special election and 2008 party primary – the races were distinguished

as contests between "Athens candidate" and "Augusta candidate." [33] This metropolitan tension is significant to GA-10 elections, and serves to further skew campaigning efforts toward the southern half of the district.

### Conclusion

GA-10 may be "white, rural, and overwhelmingly conservative," but this characterization does little justice to the region's unique narratives and electoral revelations. Residents of the 10th are poor and less educated than the nation as a whole, but they also comprise a surprisingly significant nonwhite population. District residents identify strongly with conservative causes, and hold vehement views on issues like taxes and terrorism. These ideological preferences are important because – although GA-10 mostly conforms to the Republican Party line – it does so with a passion that far surpasses the national average. As demonstrated by Bush's impressively positive 2004 assessment and Norwood's consistently commanding electoral margins, once someone gains the trust of the 10th, it is difficult to lose it again. These conclusions and others will be useful in examining the respective congressional careers of Democrat Don Johnson and Republican Paul Broun.

### PART II: CASE STUDIES

### Case Study A: Don Johnson and the Home Style Dilemma

Don Johnson rode to Congress in 1992 on a groundswell of Independent support, winning election

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29 Georgia Secretary of State Election Results, http://www.sos.georgia.gov/elections.

30 Barone, The Almanac of American Politics 2010, 444.

31 Congressman Don Johnson, Phone Interview, April 20, 2010.

32 Richard Fenno, Home Style: House Members in Their Districts (Addison-Wesley Educational Publishers, 2003), 7.

33 Barone, The Almanac of American Politics 2010, 445.

with 54% of the vote.[34]  Two years later, he was ousted by the largest electoral backlash of any congressional Democrat in the country, victim to the Republican Revolution of 1994.[35]  His 31-point loss stood as a cautionary tale Democrats across the nation, and an example of the degree to which a few choice votes can be leveraged to produce monumental electoral upheaval.  While the GA-10 of 2010 is not the same district it was in 1994, Johnson's experience offers valuable lessons as to the peculiar temperament of district residents. Furthermore, it suggests a situation in which a few small legislative changes might have produced a drastically different electoral return.  Instead of voting with his constituents, Johnson voted with his conscience.  Doing so was politically brave, but it was also a decision that presumed too much, too soon from his increasingly conservative GA-10 constituency.

Although Johnson won a clear majority in his 1992 election, he was never fully comfortable with parts of the district he had been tasked with representing. This problem is common to all such elected officials; there will always be constituencies which congressmen concede or never properly "understand." [36]  According to Fenno, these difficulties are exacerbated by perceptions of sudden population shifts or migrations.[37] Such was the case for Johnson, who saw rapid growth in the southern Republican suburbs of GA-10.[38]  According to Johnson, these suburbs were where he had found the least electoral traction in his first campaign.[39]  Many of their residents were new, and since these newcomers were not attuned to the same local issues which characterized the rural district elements, they adhered to the strict party line.  In 1992, Johnson had won every county except the affluent Augusta-Richmond suburbs.[40]  In

1994, he would lose all but two counties, with these suburban Republicans forming the foundation of that defeat.[41]

Much of Johnson's 1994 loss was due to factors outside his control.  The midterm elections following Clinton's first term were marked by unprecedented rhetoric which lambasted both policy and personal failings of congressional Democrats.  This was the time of "Contract With America" and Republican Newt Gingrich's acrimonious speeches from the House floor.  The national mood was growing bitterly opposed to Clinton and congressional Democrats, and try as he might, Johnson could not escape guilt by association.  His 78% voting congruence with the president – not particularly high for a House member – was seized upon and used aggressively as evidence that Johnson had lost his independence.[42]  While Johnson's name recognition had reached 80% by 1994, his positive association dropped from 51% to 42%, while his negatives had climbed from 21% to 34%.[43]

Responsible for this seismic shift were just two votes in step with the Clinton agenda: the August 1993 Clinton budget and the 1994 Federal Assault Rifle Ban.[44]  In many other instances, from the Brady Bill to the "Hillarycare" debacle, Johnson voted counter to the party line.  These facts were largely superfluous to the debate at hand, however, and it had only taken a handful of administration-friendly decisions to doom Johnson's bid for re-election.  Particularly for the budget vote (which took place less than halfway into his term), Johnson not yet aware of the firestorm forming around the issue.[45]  He felt relatively secure in the weight of incumbency, and as he tells it, after he won election, "Folks expected me to be there for years." [46]

Johnson had good reason to underestimate the lasting effect of the budget and assault weapons votes. While all representatives take pains to not "get too far

34 Alexander Johnson, "GA Congressional District 10, 1994 Election: A Partisan Tide Drowns a Moderate," April 2008, 3.

35 Donald Wolfensberger, Congress and the People (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2000), 147.

36 Fenno, Home Style, 22.

37 Ibid, 11.

38 Johnson, Phone Interview.

39 Ibid.

40 Ibid.

41 Ibid.

42 Johnson, "GA Congressional District 10, 1994 Election," 17.

43 Ibid, 19.

44 Ibid, 7; 9.

45 Johnson, Phone Interview.

46 Ibid.

away from the district," most believe that doing so entails a string of unpopular votes, not one or two.[47] Far more important to congressmen is ensuring that voters can identify with their elected officials, and given Johnson's time as a state senator and longtime family ties, he had no reason to doubt this relationship.[48] Yet it is a cardinal truth of politics that the dynamic of the last election in no way guarantees the next one. "You never can tell what's going to get people excited. You worry about this vote and that vote, but something you hadn't expected comes right out of the blue." [49] Much as the Republican Revolution of 1994 seems obvious in retrospect, it was not obvious prior to the fact, and in a less tumultuous situation, Johnson could have held adequate political capital to defend his votes.[50]

Had Johnson decided differently on the budget and assault weapons ban, he might still be in Congress today. Because Johnson voted his convictions, he gave Republican opponents leverage before he had established an adequate bond of trust with his constituency. Trust – and perceived betrayal – were the big themes of GA-10's 1994 campaign, and Johnson bled 56,000 voters from his winning 1992 coalition, most of whom simply stayed home on election day.[51] Speaking after August 1993's budget debate, Johnson had intoned, "If I have to give up my conscience, I don't want this job."[52] Ultimately, he voted his conscience, and paid the price for his decision.

### Case Study B: Paul Broun And The Home Style Success

If Democrat Don Johnson was faced with an intractable home style dilemma, Republican Paul Broun has enjoyed noteworthy home style success. Examining this dynamic is critical to understanding GA-10 as a whole. Were Broun not so closely attuned to the constituency of the 10th, he would almost certainly not

enjoy the level of prominence he does today. Despite nationally criticized rhetoric and practices, he has navigated seemingly severe electoral challenges with surprising ease. He is well on his way to becoming a fixture of GA-10 politics, and save sudden scandal, it is difficult to foresee his electoral defeat. In this regard, he has demonstrated a masterful understanding of the peculiarities that distinguish GA-10.

Paul Broun, Jr. can best be described as GA-10's "Accidental Congressman." Following incumbent Charlie Norwood's death in 2007, Broun was one of a slew of candidates to compete in a free-for-all runoff. Although he hailed from an Athens political family, Broun's biggest distinctions were his physician work and three previously failed congressional bids.[53] The favored candidate, Republican Jim Whitehead, was a prominent figure in both state politics and his Augusta home.[54] In the June 2007 special election, Whitehead received 44% of the vote to Broun's 22%, with the Democratic candidate finishing only 198 votes behind.[55] As Whitehead looked ahead to the mandatory runoff, however, signs of trouble began to appear. The Augusta Democrat enjoyed almost no support in the heavily populated Athens-Clarke area, and limited turnout among his Richmond-Augusta base.[56] Controversial comments he had made previously (including suggestions that the University of Georgia, save the football team, "ought to be bombed") were widely circulated, while district Democrats began a vocal movement to vote for Broun over Whitehead.[57] When the votes were tallied, Broun had won with a total of 50.4%.[58] The race had been a "Tale of Two Cities" – Broun had outperformed Whitehead ten-to-one in Athens-Clarke, while still garnering 30% of the Richmond-Augusta total.[59] Furthermore, despite Whitehead's fundraising advantage, Broun's grassroots focus had lent him a sizable advantage in capturing the

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47 Fenno, Home Style, 144.

48 Ibid, 59; Johnson, "GA Congressional District 10, 1994 Election," 2.

49 Fenno, Home Style, 16.

50 Ibid, 142.

51 Johnson, "GA Congressional District 10, 1994 Election," 18.

52 Ibid, 8.

53 McCutcheon and Lyons, Politics in America 2010, 294.

54 Barone, The Almanac of American Politics 2010, 445.

55 Ibid.

56 Ibid.

57 Ibid.

58 Ibid.

59 Ibid.

northern half of the district.

Broun was initially regarded as a one-hit wonder. After all, Democrats had supported him in the runoff in the hope that he would prove the weaker opponent in the next general election. Struggling desperately to set up shop and establish a proper fundraising apparatus, Broun was regarded critically by the national press.[60] He was facing a 2008 primary challenge from another powerful Augusta Republican, former Georgia House Majority Whip Barry Fleming. Fleming had a strong metropolitan presence, and would ultimately raise almost $1 million dollars.[61] Yet despite wide expectations to the contrary, Broun crushed Fleming in a 71%-29% electoral rout.[62] Where Fleming used his impressive connections to the state establishment, Broun largely ignored the state establishment, relying on his Athens-Clarke base and rural voter outreach. In fact, Broun almost spent his official annual allotment on franked mailings to constituents across the district.[63] While this action almost bankrupted his office and prompted several staff members to quit, his behavior also showed special appreciation for the GA-10 campaign dynamic.[64] Broun understood that direct mail would have the most palpable impact on rural voters, and help him attain the level of trust previously accorded to Norwood. Based on Broun's 2008 primary performance, his overall campaign strategy – inclusion of northern rural voters and a strong Athens-Clarke base – are well in line with the pulse of the district.

Many of Broun's public actions have drawn widespread ire, yet appear calculated to further ingratiate him with the residents of the 10th. His quotes have been the stuff of national mockery and derision. He spared no criticism following the disastrous 2008 presidential election, calling Obama a "Marxist" and McCain "inept."[65] Broun labeled the new president a "Nazi" well before the Tea Party movement, and his two most significant bills to date have been an attempt to eliminate pornography on military bases and to declare 2010, "The Year of the Bible."[66]

Partly, Broun is able to take such actions due to the fragmented nature of his district, in which he is unlikely to be penalized for his rhetoric or votes without the presence of a powerful national movement.[67] Moreso, however, Broun has taken these actions because he is an intelligent politician. While he may be criticized for his lack of serious legislative accomplishments, this is because he is not yet interested in serious legislative accomplishments. Instead, Broun recognizes that, as a "fluke" congressman, it will take him longer to establish a consistent electoral coalition.[68] He says these things and proposes these bills because it nets him free national publicity, and because it appeals to the fundamentally conservative ideology of GA-10 residents. He is focused on being a campaigner, not a legislator. If Broun remains in office, more substantive legislative actions will come later.[69]

Broun's particular home style strategy is already bearing fruit. As of mid 2009, he had raised more money than any other congressman in the Georgia delegation.[70] In the first quarter of 2010, he brought in roughly $190,000, raising his total receipts to $1.2 million.[71] Contrary to this time in 2008, he faces no strong intra-party challenger, and is considering re-election in an environment newly hospitable to Republicans nationwide. All told, Broun has become a powerful GA-10 success story. His appreciation for the unique culture and peculiarities of the district suggest that, barring scandal, he now holds a relatively "safe" seat in the United States

60 Politico, "Less money, more problems for Georgia rep" (Nov 11, 2007), http://www.politico.com.

61 Federal Elections Commission, "Fleming, Barry, 2008," http://www.fec.gov.

62 Barone, The Almanac of American Politics 2010, 445.

63 Ibid.

64 Ibid.

65 Ibid.

66 Politico, "GOP 'cranks' dominating debate" (Sept 10, 2009), "Girls, guns, and government" (April 29, 2008), "Lawmaker wants to make 2010 'Year of the Bible'" (May 22, 2009), http://www.politico.com.

67 Fenno, Home Style, 154.

68 Ibid, 176.

69 Ibid, 215.

70 Athens Banner-Herald, "Broun adds to war chest" (July 15, 2009), http://www.onlineathens.com.

71 Federal Elections Commission, "Broun, Paul, 2010," http://www.fec.gov.

Congress. That said, politics is never predictable, and no seat is forever secure. There will come a time when Broun is again vulnerable – the question, of course, is "when." ■

APPENDIX 1, CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT GA-10.



Congressional District 10

Georgia (13 Districts)

# Representative Democracy

## Plausible, Practical, and Principled

BY KRISTEN LAVERY

After demarcating every acre of land in the age of exploration, humans settled down long enough to allow true social exploration within political boundaries to begin. Democracy as a social and political institution blossomed into an ideal to be achieved on a mass scale, no longer constrained to the polities of ancient Athens. What emerged was the system of representative democracy. This adaptation provided what direct democracy could not: bridging the gap between ideals and logistical constraints. But the method, designed to preserve the interests of a large and diverse citizenry in a meaningful way, was highly contested. Ancients debated its feasibility, modern thinkers its desirability. Though the system does raise certain questions – whether elections can ensure representation of the people, whether the common good of the people even exists – it is a system that remains both desirable and feasible. Despite modern-day criticism, representative democracy remains the most practical vehicle by which to preserve the moral promise of democracy on a mass scale.

One of the first points to address is the crucial matter of the parameters and goals of elections in a representative democracy. From its earliest years to this day, the debate over democracy has centered on the most basic of questions: to whom does the right to vote extend and on what basis should leaders be elected? British philosopher John Stuart Mill once proposed that not everyone is equally qualified to vote or to lead. He certainly was not alone. Others, though, have asserted that every person – no matter what gender, race or income level – has the inherent right to unconditional suffrage, and should too be eligible to lead. One of the key advantages to representative democracy, as put forth by Mill, is its preservation of this principle of equal and universal participation, though reconciled with a certain level of required competence. While suffrage extends to all, the "individual intellect and virtue of [society's] wisest members" can be harnessed effectively in leadership roles.[1] Though Mill does imply that that elites will be given the "reigns" to the country, his central premise – that people will recognize the most competent and choose leaders accordingly – rings true.

It is a system that works even when considering the most uniformed of citizens. Those like political scientist Philip Converse warn that such voters, those with "non-attitudes," will jeopardize others with their ignorance, voting without any clear opinion.[2] Research shows, though, that voters can learn enough from social "cues" to make reasonable decisions. This fact, in conjunction with the high levels of literacy and tax-paying

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1 Mill, John Stuart. On Liberty: and Other Essays. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991. 228.

2 Fishkin, James. 'Public Opinion' and the People. 82.

> " **Every person – no matter what gender, race or income level – has the inherent right to unconditional suffrage, and should too be eligible to lead.**

rates that characterize American society, is sufficient cause to indicate the legitimacy of national elections.[3] In this way, elections allow for the perpetuation of peace and compliance through the prospect of change in power as different leaders, people and parties flex their muscles as the most competent.[4] In this way, elections are beneficial to a country, providing unique advantages not found in direct democracy.

The "common good" the people, so espoused in the classical definition of representative democracy, surely does exist in modern-day America. Many believe that the vagueness of the concept prevents its clear representation by any leader, hence undermining the institution of democracy in its entirety. Scholar Joseph Schumpeter, who refers to this "common good" in his writings on the subject, struggles with the idea that there exists a rational answer that can be manifested in a common good. It cannot be assumed, he argues, that citizens have pre-existing views on political matters, and consequently that that there is a common view to be represented. Schumpeter purports that the will of the people is a product, not a motive of political processes – largely a result of his skepticism of the competence of

the electorate. Political scientist Adam Przeworski too worries that "the majority interest is not the common interest." In cases where there is a "conflict of interest," elections by a majority will fail to ensure the common good.[5] Przeworski asserts that "governments are representative if they do what is best for the people," but that this not necessarily achieved in a vote, which is merely an aggregation of individual interests.[6] But the real advantage of representative democracy is that the system neutralizes any "ill-informed opinions" through the rationality inherent in amassed public opinion.[7] A multitude of scholars, in fact, have emphasized that the accumulation of individual opinions into a common good creates stability by striking a balance between diverse interests.[8] Fishkin draws on the example of using public opinion to determine the number of MX missiles built, but this example is beside the point. What is clear is that regardless of technical matters, like those to which Fishkin points, representative democracy does work as

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3 Ibid. 86.

4 Przeworski, Adam. "Minimalist Conception of Democracy: A Defense." 50.

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5 Ibid. 30.

6 Ibid. 31.

7 Fishkin, James. 'Public Opinion' and the People. 86.

8 Ibid. 87.

a system as a whole.[9]  While surely minute exceptions can be found, representative democracy remains the most practical tool in modern democracy to find common ground in diverse citizen bodies.

Assuming a collective will exists and it is exercised in elections to produce competent leaders, leaders must remain responsive to citizens while in office in between elections in order to preserve the moral promise that a democratic government is by the people and for the people. The goal of representative democracy is that in the absence of a direct democracy, the people can still indirectly make the laws and remain the origin of power by electing the representatives who physically enact laws. Certain scholars remain skeptical that leaders are guaranteed to respect the will of the people. Jacobs and Shapiro fear that politicians "prime" public opinion and use "crafted talk" to create the appearance of compliance with what the public supports through precise language while in reality pursuing their own agendas.[10] Furthermore, Przeworski says the concepts of prospective voting, supposed to transform a platform into a mandate once a leader is elected, and retrospective voting, supposed to hold a leader accountable, can not in reality be effectively employed. He says the people are not sufficiently informed to utilize counterfactual reasoning to pass judgment, and that no one can force a leader to abide by a mandate once he or she takes office.[11] Although there are no intrinsic mechanisms in representative democracy to ensure these, as Bernard Manin points out, "representatives who are subject to reelection have an incentive to anticipate the future judgment of the electorate on the policies they pursue."[12] This provides a source of optimism that leaders will indeed consider public opinion when making policies, rather than sacrifice their career and public reputation. Paul Burstein actually concludes that "public opinion affects policy three-quarters of the times its impact is gauged; its effect is of substantial policy

importance at least a third of the time."[13] Political leaders do regularly take public opinion into account, and, through this, a representative democracy preserves and perpetuates the idea of the people.

Through a level of competence, elections, and legitimate consideration of the public opinion, representative democracy effectively realizes the aims of democracy as an institution. Representation renders it technically feasible to attain the moral promises of participation, freedom, and liberty inherent to democracy, while augmenting the advantages offered its most direct form. A representative democracy solves the logistical issues of applying democracy to a large scale, and, despite points of contestation, it allows citizens to enjoy a democracy alongside the benefits provided by more robust, developed nations. Large governments allow citizens to enjoy greater equality and security with social services and national defense from higher tax revenues. Citizens can still participate directly in a face-to-face government on the local level if they wish, while leaving the colossal task of organizing millions of people to highly competent leaders. This endows people with more freedom to live their lives as they desire, thus enhancing one of the greatest promises of democracy: freedom. By allowing direct democracy to be adapted to mass scale, representative democracy provides a greater number of people with safety, freedom, and equality than any other institution in the world. ■

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9 Ibid. 88-89.

10 Jacobs and Shapiro. Politicians Don't Pander. 2000. XIV – XV.

11 Przeworski, Adam. "Minimalist Conception of Democracy: A Defense." 34, 38.

12 Manin, Bernard. The Principles of Representative Government. 178.

13 Burstein, Paul. "The Impact of Public Opinion on Public Policy: A Review and an Agenda." Political Research Quarterly 56.1 (2003): 29-40. 36.

# The Primary Reform

## Superdelegates, Front-Loading and Political Parties

BY MATTHEW CHIARELLO

The primary season is, undoubtedly, the most influential stretch of the modern-day presidential campaign process. From Senator Ted Kennedy's strong challenge to Jimmy Carter in 1980, to Barack Obama's victory in the Iowa caucuses that propelled him past front-runner Hillary Clinton in 2008, to the unbeatable and subsequently unchallengeable George W. Bush in 2000 and in 2004, the most momentous of primary campaigns have shaped the American political arena to be what it is today. This season of candidate nomination forms the field for the office of president, offering a wide avenue for the action of political parties. It is this party action – as parties dominate or, at the very least, influence the nominating process - which will be examined, both in terms of historical reforms as well as through the possibility of strengthening the party system through further augmentations to the process. It is a sorely "neglected" point of reform, as noted by numerous scholars.[1]

This study begins by broadly outlining the progression of the presidential nomination process from its roots in elite caucuses to the rise and fall of contentious conventions to the modern day primary procedure. From that, certain party reforms are examined – all resultant of the national shift to the primary process including the Democratic use of superdelegates and the bipartisan push to augment the duration of the primary season. The aim is to offer a perspective on the current system and, by extension, examine the possibility of strengthening the party regime through additional access to the nomination process through the role of delegate selection, unpledged delegates and primary scheduling.

### HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

### The Elite Caucuses

Originating in closed caucuses comprised of the national elite, the presidential nomination process once belonged only in the upper echelons of power. These

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1 Henderson, Harry. Campaign and Election Reform. New York: Facts On File, 2004. 36.

gatherings of early party power players – from Thomas Jefferson and his likeminded Democratic-Republicans to Alexander Hamilton and his constituent Federalists – met early in the year preceding the presidential elections and served to select a candidate to run as the party's nominee.[2] Presidential hopefuls were traditionally drawn from among the ranks of the closed caucus system, hand-selected only from a small pool of those within the party organization.

## Adoption of the Party Convention

This highly republican delegation of power - derived from the people and redirected through the intellectual and monetary elites of early American society - was quickly challenged by the rise of the convention, which sought to offer a more democratic, open, and participatory manner for candidate selection. The first of these conventions arose in 1831 from outside of the two-party system by means of the short-lived Anti-Masonic party. The two major parties of the time – the Jacksonian wing of the Democratic Party and the National Republican Party - wasted no time in co-opting the notion of the nominating convention, with the Democrats hosting their first in 1832 while the Republicans followed suit several years later in 1856.[3]

## Rise of the Presidential Primary

Having grown accustomed to the participatory functions offered by party conventions, but still disturbed by the amount of control in the nomination process held in the hands of party elite, the Progressive movement – led in part by Wisconsin Governor Robert La Follete - sought to reform the convention-centric system by inventing the system of presidential primaries as a national means of selecting nominees for office. Although the direct election primary process existed in certain pockets of the nation, the national move to the primary system did not occur until the beginning of the 20th century.[4]

Progressive reforms leading up to the election year of 1912 pushed for the inclusion of a direct primary system in a handful of states, offering an alternative to the dominant convention schema. This reformation, while nominally present from 1912 onward, came to the fore in national politics following the disastrous 1968 Democratic National Convention in Chicago, which was dominated by domestic riots and violence along with divisive political strife in the manner of selection.[5] This collapse of nomination procedure through high political drama led to the rapid implosion of the convention as the central means of candidate selection and thus revitalized the notion of the primary process. What resulted was the present day convention – which is, in the view of the Congressional Digest, reduced to a mere "formality."[6]

## SUPERDELEGATES & UNPLEDGED DELEGATES: POTENTIAL FOR REFORM

### Lasting Reforms and the Advent of the Superdelegate

This dynamic move away from the convoluted and seemingly corrupt convention method of candidate selection was facilitated by the Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection, or, more simply, the McGovern-Fraser Commission. Assembled as a response to the 1968 Democratic Convention and the landslide electoral victory of Richard Nixon, the Commission proposed 18 guidelines for state selection of delegates in preparation of the 1972 Convention.[7]

Central to the reforms handed down by the McGovern-Fraser Commission was the applied notion of proportional representation in candidate selection, which manifested itself in the Democratic form of su-

2 McCaffrey, Paul. "The Nominating Process: From Caucus to Convention." U.S. Election System. New York: H.W. Wilson, 2004. 71-72.

3 Ibid

4 Alan Ware points to the way in which the Democratic Party of Pennsylvania allowed for primary balloting as early as 1842 in his discussion of the "Crawford County System." See: Ware, Alan. "The

Spread of Direct Nominations." The American Direct Primary: Party Institutionalization and Transformation in the North. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2002. 97-99.

5 Johnson, Haynes. "1968 Democratic Convention." Smithsonian Magazine Aug. 2008. Web. ‹http;//www.smithsonianmag.com/history-archaeology/1968-democratic-convention.htm.›.

6 McCaffrey, Paul. "The Nominating Process: From Caucus to Convention." U.S. Election System. New York: H.W. Wilson, 2004. 84-85.

7 Center, Judith A. "1972 Democratic Convention Reforms and Party Democracy." Political Science Quarterly 89.2 (1974): 325-50. JSTOR. Web. ‹http://www.jstor.org/stable/2149263›.

perdelegates. Defined broadly by Marjorie Hershey as "all Democratic governors and members of Congress, current and former presidents and vice presidents, and all members of the Democratic National Committee," who stand as an uncommitted bloc of delegates, represent nearly 20 percent of the whole of the seated delegation.[8] The Commission itself refers to these particular individuals as, "delegates seated based on the position they hold as unpledged party leader and elected official (PLEO) delegates."[9] This unpledged voting block offers an avenue of power for the party to voice its collective – if sometimes fractious – opinion for candidate selection on the floor of the convention. While nearly 80 percent of delegates are selected based on the direction of the primaries and caucuses held during the first half of the election year, the final 20 percent of the selection remains in the hands of the party. This fact is especially significant in both close races in which the candidate for the party can be decided on the floor of the convention and in highly disparate elections in which the candidate of the party is able to either stay active in the race or pull a great distance ahead through PLEO support.

### Modern Delegates and Superdelegates

The 2008 presidential bids of Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton exemplify this system of proportional voting and PLEO sway. At the time, there were 4,257 delegates available to be seated at the Democratic National Convention. Of that number, 3,434 were registered as "pledged delegates," - and as such were subject in their selection to the results of their respective state's caucus or primary – while 823 of the total were seated as PLEOs.

In order to secure the nomination according to this system, a candidate would have been required a total of 2,118 delegates. Considering the fact that Obama received the party's nomination at the Convention he exceeded the requisite number by 111.5, taking 2,229.5 delegates to Clinton's 1896.5. Significantly, within these delegate totals is the number of superdelegates awarded

with Obama taking 463 and Clinton merely 257 [Figure A]. Had the Democratic party kept its pre-1968 nomination rules, or taken the stance of the contemporary Republican party with exceptionally little weight on PLEO delegates, Clinton would likely have taken the nomination – with a margin of nearly 112 votes. By the Republican standard of delegate assignment Clinton could very well have obtained enough of an edge to have taken the party nomination away from Obama.

### Superdelegate Reform 2012?

Due to the contentious nature of the PLEO framework within the Democratic Party and in light of its highly influential nature in the abovementioned 2008 election, there has been a recent push to dilute the influence of superdelegates in the nomination process. Detractors of the system, including Senator Amy Klobuchar (D-MN) – herself a superdelegate in 2008 - argue that the present lengthy roll of unpledged voters injures the democratic nature of the selection process by granting too large a voice to the party organization rather than to the electorate. Klobuchar has proposed that a cap should be set for the percentage of delegates that can be designated as unpledged at 10 percent. This spirit of reform has subsequently made its way into the agenda of the Democratic National Committee (DNC). A new initiative led by the chairman of the DNC, Governor Tim Kaine (D-VA), along with House Majority Whip James Clyburn (D-SC) is set to offer reform to the system of superdelegates by substantially reducing their number. This push, according to Kaine will attempt to produce a democratic reform, "that improves the presidential nominating process [by putting] voters first and [ensuring] that as many people as possible can participate."[10]

### Modern Republican System of Nomination

While the Democratic Party, as discussed above, mandates the method of proportional representation in the nomination process in order to better incorporate the potential voting blocs of the party, the Republican

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8 Hershey, Marjorie Randon. "Choosing the Presidential Nominees." Party Politics in America. New York: Pearson Longman, 2007. 179.

9 Dean, Howard, comp. Delegate Selection Rules. Washington D.C: Democratic National Committee, 2006.

10 O'Brien, Michael. "DNC to Reform Primary System, Cutting Many 'superdelegates'" The Hill. Web. ‹http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/campaigns/37604-dnc-to-reform-primary-system-cutting-many-superdelegates›.

Party does not offer such a directive. Rather, similar to the Democratic Party before 1968, the Republican Party does not offer a unified vision of the nomination procedures. That is to say that the present Republican strategy is a method of state self-determination in which individual states can express their status and preferred means of selection from within a range of options. These choices range from the traditional Republican "winner-take-all" format in which the plurality winner of votes during a primary takes the full compliment of delegates, to district-based proportional representation, to state- and district- wide proportional representation.

### Unpledged Republicans

As a corollary to this system of state selection, the Republicans do not hold the same superdelegate rules as those of the Democrats. Rather, the party offers a small system of unpledged delegates, much like PLEOs, but with a smaller percentage − a mere 5 percent in 2008 - in relation to the Democratic PLEOs − of nearly 20 percent in the same year - and thus less political sway. This marginalization of the unpledged delegates mutes the voice of the party in the national and state debates. While the Republican Party is able to back a candidate of choice through monetary means, it cannot effectively do so through affiliated party votes. Perhaps the incorporation of Democratic-style rules for delegate selection would aid the Republican Party in this particular area.

### Utility of the Unpledged in 2008

In the contest between presidential hopefuls Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama, the voice of the party was made clear; as the primary season progressed, Obama overtook Clinton as the contest's frontrunner and with it came the support of the party. Whereas this Democratic support played a pivotal role in selecting the party's nominee, the voice of the Republican Party organization proved passive, to say the least, in the contest waged within its own party. Unlike the vast amount of delegates in the Democratic process, the Republican nomination in 2008 required only a total of 1,191 delegates out of a possible 2,146 with 570 unpledged votes. John McCain, the long-time front-runner, secured 1,563 in total with the next highest delegate counts at 282

and 272 for Mike Huckabee and Mitt Romney, respectively.[11] McCain's total includes 129 of the possible 135 fully unpledged delegates, placing him well above the requirement for the nomination [Figure B]. But what is the utility of such a small percentage of unpledged votes in the mix, when McCain received the nomination solely based on pledge votes? For greater strength of party voice, the Republicans should certainly consider a superdelegate system as utilized by the Democrats. In doing so, the party in organization's figurative voice would be raised to a position of primacy over the voice of the party in the electorate, while it is presently marginalized to a scant 5 percent.[12]

### PERIOD OF PRIMARIES: REFORMING THE CALENDAR

### The Present System

In an attempt to "generate voter participation and grassroots mobilization" the presidential primary season allows the electorate to determine, in part, the candidate that will run for the office of president on behalf of the party.[13] Originally structured around three state-determined systems of voting − closed, in which only registered party members can participate, open, in which all party and non-party voters can participate, and blanket, held by California, Washington, and Alaska in which non-registered members of the electorate can select candidates from either party − the present system only endorses the open and closed system, despite sub-variation of semi-closed and semi-open, with the recent constitutional removal of the blanket primary. Over 40 states engaged in some form of primary election for president in 2004, with the remainder opting for caucus selection. An equivalent number of primary contests were held in the election of 2008 over the period of January 8 to June 3, beginning in New Hampshire and

11 "RealClearPolitics - 2008 Elections - Republican Delegate Count." RealClearPolitics - Opinion, News, Analysis, Videos and Polls. Web. 01 May 2010. ‹http://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2008/president/republican_delegate_count.html›.

12 Ibid

13 McCaffrey, Paul. "The Nominating Process: From Caucus to Convention." U.S. Election System. New York: H.W. Wilson, 2004. 84-85.

concluding in Montana and New Mexico.[14]

This modern-day system of nomination procedures offers a very particular avenue for party reform. Due to the exaggerated importance granted to states who participate in the "phenomena" of front-loading in which "states hold their primaries in large groups early in the year," the parties are forced to subject their preferred candidates to potential populist sentiment or fiscal superiority in the early stages of the primary contest.[15] (As happened with Obama's victory over Clinton.) The party, through reform of the system, could allow for a greater party hand in the selection of candidates, while decreasing the influence of a handful of states over the national race for president. This scenario in particular has prompted the DNC to reevaluate the calendar of primaries by "changing the dates between which primaries and caucuses may be held." These changes, although as of yet unreleased by the DNC are evident in several avenues of reform as addressed below in the form of rotating primaries and population based scheduling.

### Undue Importance and the NASS Rotating Reform

In an attempt to address the issue of front-loaded state advantage in the primary season – including the New Hampshire primary which is held as the first in the nation as dictated by its state constitution and the caucus structure of Iowa that is bound by state law to be held a week before the primary of New Hampshire – the National Association of Secretaries of State (NASS) has proposed a Regional Presidential Primary Plan. This plan, introduced by NASS in 2000 has received the endorsement of the Carter-Baker Commission on Federal Election Reform and has, as of 2007, been adopted by Senator Joe Lieberman (I-Conn) and Klobuchar in a legislative form to be presented to the Congress. The structure of the regional primary calls for the nation to be divided into four regions – the Northeast, West, Midwest

and South – which each encompass "roughly the same number of votes in the Electoral College according to the 1990 census." The first year of implementation would feature a March through June schedule with the regions holding primaries one region per month. As the proposal is centered both on regions and on rotation, the region that held the first set of primaries in March of the first year would then move to the back of the line and hold their primaries in June of the subsequent election year [Figure C].[16]

### The American Plan

A corollary of the NASS platform of reassigning importance of state primary dates is what is typically referred to as the American Plan as created and lobbied for by Senator Bill Brock (R-TN) and the organization FairVote. This system, described as a "graduated random presidential primary," calls for the division of primaries based on state populations. The schedule would be randomly determined by congressional districts so that the states with the least number of congressional districts would commence the primary season and the states with greater populations (and, by extension, greater number of congressional seats) would end the process. FairVote claims that such a reform of the system would "treat all states even-handedly," with the average "small state" voting after 32.5 percent of the country and the average "large state" holding their primaries after no more than 45.5 percent of the country has voted. And yet, that still leaves a sizable spread of 13 percent as an unattractive measure to this proposal. That figure along with the nearly random nature of the selection process creates some potential flaws in a system that aspires to level the playing field for potential candidates [Figure D].[17]

### CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF PRIMARY REFORM

With a presidential selection system dependent on the voice of the people and the action of the parties, the mechanism by which the process functions should

14 Election Guide 2008 - Presidential Election - Politics - Democrats - The New York Times." Politics - Election News - 2010 Midterms-Breaking News, Multimedia, Blogs, Results - The New York Times - The New York Times. 08 May 2010. Web. 01 May 2010. ‹http://politics.nytimes.com/election-guide/2008/primaries/democraticprimaries/index.html›.

15 McCaffrey, Paul. "The Nominating Process: From Caucus to Convention." U.S. Election System. New York: H.W. Wilson, 2004. 84-85.

16 Nass.org - NASS Regional Primaries Plan." Nass.org - Home. Web. 01 May 2010. ‹http://nass.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=74&Itemid=210›.

17 "The American Plan." Fix the Primaries. Web. 01 May 2010. ‹http://fixtheprimaries.com/solutions/americanplan/›.

operate in a manner amendable to both actors – the people and the parties. The growing trend of democratic ideals within the United States from the Progressive Movement to the McGovern-Fraser Commission has sought to supplant the traditionally republican nature of the nominating process. These initial reforms – including the move to primary elections and the adoption of unpledged delegates – have pushed the nomination process into democratic territory, further and further from the reach of party organizational structures, slowly and gradually muting the voice of the party on the national scene. The above does not discount the value of the rise in democratic mechanism, but it does, hope-

fully, serve the purpose of illuminating the potential downsides to a system with a marginalized party apparatus. Thus the above reforms - downscaling the number of superdelegates in the Democratic Party, increasing their number in the Republican camp, potentially determining the primary calendar based on rotating regions or population - seek to create a venue for the population at large through the party in the electorate to select presidential candidates alongside the national party organization. ■

FIGURE A
DEMOCRATIC PARTY DELEGATE COUNTS 2008

| Delegate Count (2,118 Needed to Win) | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| State | Date | Delegates | Obama | Clinton |
| Total | - | | 2229.5 | 1896.5 |
| Super Delegates | - | 823 | 463 | 257 |
| Pledged Delegates | - | 3434 | 1766.5 | 1639.5 |

Source: "RealClearPolitics - 2008 Elections - Democratic Delegate Count." RealClearPolitics - Opinion, News, Analysis, Videos and Polls. Web. 01 May 2010. ‹http://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2008/president/democratic_delegate_count.html›.

FIGURE B
REPUBLICAN PARTY DELEGATE COUNTS 2008

| Delegate Count (1,191 Needed to Win) | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| State | Date | Delegates | McCain | Romney | Huckabee | Paul |
| Total | - | | 1563 | 272 | 282 | 29 |
| Unpledged RNC | - | 0 | 129.0 | 1.0 | 5.0 | - |

Source: "RealClearPolitics - 2008 Elections - Republican Delegate Count." RealClearPolitics - Opinion, News, Analysis, Videos and Polls. Web. 01 May 2010. ‹http://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2008/president/republican_delegate_count.html›.

## FIGURE C
## REGIONAL PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARY PLAN



"Under the proposal, the United States is divided into four regions - Northeast, Midwest, West, and South - having roughly the same number of votes in the Electoral College according to the 1990 census. The Northeast region (in red) comprises of 13 states and 127 electoral votes. The Midwest (in yellow) has a 129 electoral votes spread across 12 states. The 13 western states (in blue) have 119 electoral votes. The South is the largest region (in green) with a total of 163 electoral votes across 13 states."

Source: "Fix the Primaries: The Regional Lottery Plan." Web. 01 May 2010. ‹http://fixtheprimaries.com/solutions/rotatingregional/›.

## FIGURE D
## THE AMERICAN PLAN



"The system features a schedule consisting of ten intervals, generally of two weeks, during which randomly selected states may hold their primaries."

Source: "Fix the Primaries: The Regional Lottery Plan." Web. 01 May 2010. ‹http://fixtheprimaries.com/solutions/americanplan/›.

# Interview
## with Neil Maholtra

Neil Malhotra is an Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania. He also holds secondary appointments in The Wharton School and the Annenberg School for Communication.

His research has been published or is forthcoming in the American Political Science Review, the American Journal of Political Science, the Journal of Politics, and the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, among other outlets, and has received awards from the American Political Science Association, the Midwest Political Science Association, and the American Association for Public Opinion Research (Pacific Chapter).

He received his MA and PhD in political science from Stanford University, where he was the Melvin & Joan Lane Graduate Fellow. He received a BA in economics (summa cum laude, Phi Beta Kappa, Distinction in the Major) from Yale University. Prior to joining Penn, he served on the faculty of the Stanford Graduate School of Business.

OUR ISSUE FOCUSES ON THE AMERICAN ELECTORAL PROCESS, ONE OF YOUR AREAS OF EXPERTISE. WHAT ARE YOUR REFLECTIONS ON THE MOST RECENT SET OF MIDTERM ELECTIONS? HOW DO YOU SEE THE ELECTIONS AFFECTING US HERE IN THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA AND THE CITY OF PHILADELPHIA?

Generally speaking, I thought this election cycle was a good example of how you can't always interpret election results to be a result of the electorate rationally responding to economic conditions. After the 2008 election, everyone was saying that the American public was rational – that Republicans were crossing over because they were upset with the economy. But you see a lot of those people shifting back two years later, even though it's hard to attribute much of the current economic conditions to the Obama Administration. And if you look at the differences between 2010 and 2008, on most metrics the economy has gotten a lot better.

When we're thinking about Pennsylvania in particular, the Republicans now have complete control of the state legislature. We might see changes to the liquor control board – I assume that's an issue undergraduates care about – that make Pennsylvania a normal state in terms of the selling of alcohol. Given the patronage system involved in the selling of licenses, I'm not sure how likely change will be.

Like many other places, the state of Pennsylvania and the city of Philadelphia are facing huge budget shortfalls. How will that affect students? You're lucky you don't live in Camden, where the police force was cut in half.

Another big issue at the city level is pension reform – the DROP program specifically. That might become an important issue in the Mayor's reelection campaign.

### HOW DO YOU SEE BIPARTISANSHIP MANIFESTING ITSELF IN THE POLITICAL ARENA TODAY?

Well, it depends on what you mean by bipartisanship. Despite what you hear of an overwhelming lack of bipartisanship, when you look at the health care bill you have to realize that the opposition to the bill was, in fact, a bipartisan effort. The no votes were a collection of Democrats and Republicans. That's just one example that people don't often think of that shows that our representatives work together more than you might think.

I do think that too much emphasis is placed on party and not enough on ideology. The healthcare bill was always going to be what a conservative Democrat wants, because that individual is in the center of the legislature – and that's what we got. The question then might become: did it take longer than it should have? That might be, but that's more a question of legislative strategy and ruling. It's a complicated question, because you expect representatives to represent what their constituents want and bring those beliefs into Washington and vote on them the way their constituents want them to. If our representatives go to Washington and don't do that, is that good for democracy? No. So then is it bad that right-wing members of right-wing districts vote in right-wing ways? Certainly not. So, I think one central question is: do we really want bipartisanship if it reduces representation?

### HOW ABOUT OUR COUNTRY'S POLITICAL DISCOURSE, CERTAINLY A HOT TOPIC IN RECENT MONTHS?

Well I think everyone can agree that civil discourse is better than no civil discourse. And I do think that the Arizona shootings brought this fact into light – not that a lack of civil discourse was the cause of the shootings, because it probably wasn't. Keep in mind that during these great periods of Senate comity – when Democrats and Republicans were getting drinks after work – lynchings reached their highest point in the South. So, what does it mean to have civility? America has become an increasingly less violent society over time. We're at a low point of violence in this country, and incivility has only increased in politics. Look at South Korea, where politicians will just beat each other up on the floor of the legislature – that's an extremely safe, nonviolent society. It's impossible to know, but it doesn't mean that from a normative Kantian perspective we shouldn't have uncivil discourse – though I think most everyone agrees that we probably shouldn't.

### DO YOU SEE THE ARIZONA SHOOTINGS AS RELATED TO THE SUBSEQUENT 10-POINT BOOST IN PRESIDENT OBAMA'S POPULARITY RATINGS?

Well, I think there are a lot of factors that are more important. The lame duck session was highly productive – and we know people like productivity. The President got the tax deal passed, which, however controversial, was a good example of a bipartisan effort. And, of course, the economy has improved.

### AS YOUNG PEOPLE IN A WORLD WHERE WE'RE HEARING SO MUCH DIFFERENT INFORMATION FROM VARIOUS SOURCES, WHAT TOOLS OR ADVICE DO YOU RECOMMEND TO DO WHAT YOUR NEW CLASS SUGGESTS – ANALYZE THE POLITICAL WORLD?

You know, it's hard to say -- of course, that's why I'd like people to take the class. The point of the class isn't to be one where you learn a lot of "stuff" – in this class you'll learn very little "stuff" – the point is, instead, to learn how to think so that anytime you're confronted with a question you will know how to approach it. For example, I do think that it's possible that some Penn students think that the Sarah Palin ad led to the Giffords shooting. The real question though is, what kind of evidence would you need to show that? You can't just show that Palin ran the ad before the shooting occurred, you would also have to know: What would the world look like if the ad had never been run? Would you still have the same outcome? That's what we call selecting on the dependent variable, you can't just select on the shooting occurring. The broad question is, what evidence do you need to make your claim believable? ■